The Resilience Of Smart Energy Systems Against Adversarial Attacks, Operational Degradation And Variabilities by Pradhan, Parth
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
Theses and Dissertations
8-1-2018
The Resilience Of Smart Energy Systems Against
Adversarial Attacks, Operational Degradation And
Variabilities
Parth Pradhan
Lehigh University, parth1811@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pradhan, Parth, "The Resilience Of Smart Energy Systems Against Adversarial Attacks, Operational Degradation And Variabilities"
(2018). Theses and Dissertations. 4315.
https://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd/4315
THE RESILIENCE OF SMART ENERGY SYSTEMS
AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS, OPERATIONAL
DEGRADATION AND VARIABILITIES
by
PARTH PRADHAN
Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee
of Lehigh University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical Engineering
Lehigh University
August, 2018
c© Copyright by Parth Pradhan 2018
All Rights Reserved
ii
Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Date
Date Accepted
Dissertation Advisor
Committee Members:
Prof. Shalinee Kishore
(Committee Chair)
Prof. Parv Venkitasubramaniam
Prof. Ricky S. Blum
Prof. Boris Defourny
iii
Acknowledgements
This dissertation would not have been possible without the care and support of many
people during my journey as a PhD student. Their selfless efforts and contributions in
transforming me from a disillusioned average Joe to a researcher with a sense of purpose
is phenomenal and deserve sincere acknowledgment.
First and foremost, I would like to express utmost gratitude to my academic advisor,
Prof. Shalinee Kishore. She is the embodiment of pure intellect working with whom for
five years never felt like a dull and tedious experience. It was one of the happiest and
proud moments of my life when she bestowed confidence on me and offered to work with
her as a PhD student. Since then, she has been playing a pivotal role in shaping my
research career in the field of smart energy systems. She provided me with ample support,
resource and freedom to pursue research topics of my interest enabled me to grow as an
independent researcher. She has also put a positive mark in my personal life by never
failing to help my family at the time of trouble as well as trying in numerous ways to
make them feel comfortable in the foreign land.
Secondly, I would like to express my great appreciation to Prof. Parv Venkitasubrama-
niam, Prof. Rick S. Blum and Prof. Boris Defourny for serving on my doctoral committee
and carefully reviewing my work and providing necessary feedback. I feel fortunate to
have worked with all of my committee members in various research projects where I got
to learn from them the different styles of conducting meaningful research. I owe a deep
sense of gratitude to Prof. Parv for instilling a passion for research in interesting topics
like cyber-physical system security, anonymous networking, etc. The courses like data
networks, stochastic control, information theory that he taught have tremendously helped
iv
me deal with complex problems that I encountered in my research work with ease. His
intellectual disposition, strong work ethics, ability to think mathematically made him my
role model for the rest of my life. I shall also be forever indebted to his financial sup-
port during the first year of my PhD studies. I would like to thank Prof. Blum for his
research collaboration on two research projects namely ocean wave power grid integration
and security of wide area monitoring system. His ingenious insights, active participation,
and helpful feedback contributed immensely to the timely completion of the work. Many
thanks to Prof. Defourny for all the interesting and informative discussion sessions on
stochastic optimization and his generous help in efficiently writing codes for designing
offshore renewable farm maintenance strategy.
I would like to thank Prof. Alberto Lamadrid and Prof. Lawrence V. Snyder and Prof.
Arindam Banerjee, PORTLAB faculty members, for sharing their wisdom and connecting
me with right resources which kept me motivated to work on different ocean wave power
technologies. Special thanks to Prof. Lamadrid for advising me on Electricity Market
research and helping me learn the technicalities of writing good research papers. Sincere
gratitude to staff members of ECE department, David Morrisette, Diane Hubinsky, Ruby
Scott and Christine Lake for their help over these years.
I extend my appreciation to my past and present lab-mates, Abhishek Mishra, Kwami
Senam Sedzro, Kostas Hatalis, Jiyun Yao, Chengbo Zhang, Omid Javidbakht, K.G.
Nagananda for the camaraderie and fun-filled discussions on different research and off-
research topics. I would like to thank my friends at SPCRL Lab: Basel Alnajjab, Alireza
Famili, Anantha Krishna Kaarthik. Basel proved to be a rare gem as a colleague who
provided constant support and motivation to sail through difficult and unfamiliar areas
in ocean wave research. I would like to thank my other Lehigh friends and room-mates,
Neeraj Dubey, Ramarao Vemula, Rahul Raghavendra, Avinash Balasubramaniam, Samb-
hawa Priya who made my stay at Lehigh a memorable one. I will forever cherish the time
when I had so many around to empathize and patiently hear my common frustrations of
PhD life.
This thesis would have never accomplished without the support of my family members.
v
My wife, Ipsita, left no stone unturned to make my PhD journey a seamless and com-
fortable one. Her devotion to our family, continual support and selfless desire to see me
as a successful researcher have been exemplary. My two and half-year-old son, Priyansh
Pradhan, has been a source of joy and positivity. I would like to extend my deepest grati-
tude to my father Pradip Kumar Pradhan, my mother Jayashree Pradhan and my brother
Siddharth Pradhan. They have always had the highest hopes for me, and have held an
unwavering faith in my abilities.
vi
Contents
Acknowledgements iv
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
Abstract 1
1 Stealthy Attacks in Dynamical Systems: Tradeoffs between Utility and
Detectability with Application in Anonymous Systems 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Mathematical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Optimal Tradeoff and Adversary Policy for i.i.d Input Streams . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Adversary Policy and Cost under general Markovian Framework . . . . . . 16
1.5 Application in the study of admissible length in Anonymous Communication 27
1.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.7 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2 Prospects of Wave Power Grid Integration 42
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.4 Simulation and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
vii
3 Optimal Predictive Maintenance Policy for an Ocean Wave Farm 55
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Mathematical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4 Optimal Control Strategy of Battery participating in Frequency Regu-
lation Market 84
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Optimal Battery Control Strategy acknowledging Continuous Degradation . 85
4.3 Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5 GPS Timing Synchronization Attack: Characterization and Detection
in Smart Grid Networks 95
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.3 Detection of TSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Bibliography 117
Vita 132
viii
List of Tables
2.1 Analysis of electrical System under high penetration of renewables under
three criteria for evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Parameters in Reward Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2 Parameters for Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Policy Under Baseline and
Five Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3 Transition Probabilities of a 3-state Markov Model of Weather [1] . . . . . . 72
3.4 Comparison of Objective Values under Different Maintenance Strategies . . 73
ix
List of Figures
1.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Trade Off Between Utility and Detectability in scenario 1 and 2(i.i.d input
process) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Trade Off Between Utility and Detectability for markov input process after
greedy policy under scenario I when there is perfect side information(input
Y known) and scenario II when there is no side information(input Y not
known) and after upper bound under scenario I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Comparison between the optimal tradeoff for an i.i.d input process when
internal state of the controller is observable, and the greedy policy tradeoff
when internal state is not observable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Mix receives packets from two users, encrypts and randomly reorders them,
and transmits them in their corresponding outgoing link. Eve observes the
arrival and departure processes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.6 Utility Vs Detectability trade-off in a mix of buffer capacity m=8 . . . . . . 35
1.7 Admissible length Vs buffer state y in a mix of buffer capacity m=8 . . . . 35
1.8 Empirical Kullback-Leibler Divergence as a function of weighting factor for
optimal adversarial strategies with and without side information . . . . . . 37
2.1 Interpolated power matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2 Time series of wind power (top) and wave power (bottom) . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 Wave height and wave power comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4 One-line diagram of 5-Bus test network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5 Capacity reserves in a typical summer day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
x
2.6 Ramp reserves in a typical summer day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1 Ocean wave farm consisting of energy converters in 3 possible states: (1) Healthy,
(2) Unhealthy, (3) Faulty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Expectation of ocean wave farm’s state (excluding weather state) as a func-
tion of time under “Do not repair” action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Optimal Policy for the studied cases(Filled circle: Repair. White circle: Do
not repair) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4 Steady-state probabilities in greyscale (darker means higher probability
value). The trajectory of expected wave farm state under optimal policy
is indicated by a continuous curve that starts from an initial state marked
with the asterisk (*). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 GSS in electricity network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Trade-off plot obtained from type II problem formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Optimal response signal trajectory under type II problem formulation . . . . . . . 92
4.4 Performance score in four hours corresponding to each hourly market price under
type III problem formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5 Optimal response signal in four hours under type III problem formulation . . . . . 93
4.6 Trade-off plot under type I problem formulation that has SoC based degradation
factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.7 SoC level and response signal trajectories obtained from type I problem formulation
that has SoC based degradation factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.1 A 3 Machine, 9 bus test system (known as P.M Anderson 9 Bus). . . . . . . 106
5.2 RMSE of the rotor angle ∆δ1 when the TSA is induced at tc = 5s. β1(tc) =
b1 or b2 where b1 = 8.33ms and b2 = 0.833ms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3 RMSE of the internal voltage ∆E1 of the generator 1 when the TSA is
induced at tc = 5s. β1(tc) : b1 = 8.33ms or b2 = 0.833ms. . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4 The ROCs of the proposed test compared to that of LRT for different values
of the attack parameter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
xi
5.5 The ROCs of the proposed test and that of LRT for different window sizes:
N1 = 100, N2 = 80, N3 = 60, N4 = 40. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6 The ROCs of the proposed test for unknown time of attack. The ROC of
the clairvoyant LRT is also plotted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.7 The ratio of Probability of detection obtained from residual test and GLRT
test versus number of observations used in the tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
xii
Abstract
The presented research investigates selected topics concerning resilience of critical
energy infrastructures against certain types of operational disturbances and/or failures
whether natural or man-made. A system is made resilient through deployment of physical
devices enabling real-time monitoring, strong feedback control system, advanced system
security and protection strategies or through prompt and accurate man-made actions or
both. Our work seeks to develop well-planned strategies that act as a foundation for such
resiliency enabling techniques.
First (chapter 1), we study the security aspect of cyber-physical systems which inte-
grate physical system dynamics with digital cyberinfrastructure. Smart electricity grid is
a common example of this system type. In this work, an abstract theoretical framework
is proposed to study data injection/modification attacks on Markov modeled dynamical
systems from the perspective of an adversary. The adversary is capable of modifying a
temporal sequence of data and the physical controller is equipped with prior statistical
knowledge about the data arrival process to detect the presence of an adversary. The goal
of the adversary is to modify the arrivals to minimize a utility function of the controller
while minimizing the detectability of his presence as measured by the K-L divergence
between the prior and posterior distribution of the arriving data. The trade-off between
these two metrics controller utility and the detectability cost is studied analytically for
different underlying dynamics.
Our second study (chapter 2) reviews the state of the art ocean wave generation tech-
nologies along with system level modeling while providing an initial study of the impacts of
integration on a typical electrical grid network as compared to the closest related technol-
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ogy, wind energy extraction. In particular, wave power is computed from high resolution
measured raw wave data to evaluate the effects of integrating wave generation into a small
power network model. The system with no renewable energy sources and the system with
comparable wind generation have been used as a reference for evaluation. Simulations
show that wave power integration has good prospects in reducing the requirements of
capacity and ramp reserves, thus bringing the overall cost of generation down.
Our third study(chapter 3) addresses robustness of resilient ocean wave generation
systems. As an early-stage but rapidly developing technology, wave power extraction
systems must have strong resilience requirements in harsh, corrosive ocean environments
while enabling economic operation throughput their lifetime. Such systems are comprised
of Wave Energy Converters (WECs) that are deployed offshore and that derive power
from rolling ocean waves. The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for WECs is high
and one important way to reduce this cost is to employ strategies that minimize the cost
of maintenance of WECs in a wave farm. In this work, an optimal maintenance strategy
is proposed for a group of WECs, resulting in an adaptive scheduling of the time of
repair, based on the state of the entire farm. The state-based maintenance strategy seeks
to find an optimal trade-off between the moderate revenue generated from a farm with
some devices being in a deteriorated or failed state, and the high repair cost that typifies
ocean wave farm maintenance practices. The formulation uses a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) approach to devise an optimal policy which is based on the count of WECs in
different operational states.
Our fourth study (chapter 4) focuses on enabling resilient electricity grids with Grid
Scale Storage (GSS). GSS offers resilient operations to power grids where the generation,
transmission, distribution and consumption of electricity has traditionally been “just in
time”. GSS offers the ability to buffer generated energy and dispatch it for consumption
later, e.g., during generation outage and shortages. Our research addresses how to operate
GSS to generate revenue efficiency in frequency regulation markets. Operation of GSS in
frequency regulation markets is desirable due to its fast response capabilities and the
corresponding revenues. However, GSS health is strongly dependent on its operation
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and understanding the trade-offs between revenues and degradation factors is essential.
This study answers whether or not operating GSS at high efficiency regularly reduces its
long-term performance (and thereby its offered resilience to the power grid).
Our fifth study (chapter 5) focuses on the resilience of Wide Area Measurement Sys-
tems (WAMS) which is an integral part of modern electrical grid infrastructure. The
problem of global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on smart grid endowed with
phasor measurement units (PMUs) is addressed, taking into account the dynamical be-
havior of the states of the system. It is shown how GPS spoofing introduces a timing
synchronization error in the phasor readings recorded by the PMU and alters the mea-
surement matrix of the dynamical model. A generalized likelihood ratio-based hypotheses
testing procedure is devised to detect changes in the measurement matrix when the system
is subjected to a spoofing attack. Monte Carlo simulations are performed on the 9-bus, 3-
machine test grid to demonstrate the implication of the spoofing attack on dynamic state
estimation and to analyze the performance of the proposed hypotheses test. Asymptotic
performance analysis of the proposed test, which can be used for large-scale smart grid
networks, is also presented.
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Chapter 1
Stealthy Attacks in Dynamical
Systems: Tradeoffs between
Utility and Detectability with
Application in Anonymous
Systems
1.1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems such as the smart grid, structural health monitoring, and ad-
vanced transportation systems which merge traditional physical control systems with cy-
ber communication networks are vulnerable to adversarial intrusion that aim to cripple
the functioning of these systems. In particular, the integration of the cyber information
layer exposes the physical system functioning to cyber security vulnerabilities which could
result in tangible economic losses and physical damages to our basic infrastructural sys-
tems. Real-world incidents and scientific studies have already demonstrated the inability
of the power grid to ensure a reliable service in the presence of cyber attacks [2–4]. For
instance, consider the Stuxnet worm, which first came to light in 2010, and was designed
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to target supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured
to control and monitor specific industrial processes [5]. By injecting false data into the
programmable logic controllers (PLC) in the SCADA systems, the worm caused critical
malfunctioning of a nuclear power plant. The false injection mechanism stayed undetected
for several months whilst jeopardizing a large scale energy operation. This is an example
of disruption of internal physical systems through compromised external communication
links. When our infrastructural systems are vulnerable to mere communication failures,
an attack such as Stuxnet demonstrates the potential for large scale disruption at seem-
ingly very little cost to an adversary. The lack of strong cyber-physical security is a severe
impediment to the success of future engineering systems that integrate cyber and physical
components and are envisioned to transform our critical infrastructures.
Mathematically, cyber physical systems merge the continuous time physical system dy-
namics with the predominantly discrete time data processing methodologies, which gives
rise to modeling challenges [6] and the development of a standardized framework of anal-
ysis. Consequently, the study of cyber physical security has focused on specific systems,
most notably the smart electricity grid and transportation systems, and the analysis of at-
tacks and countermeasures within the milieu of those specific systems. These studies have
typically focused on one-shot attacks where an adversary aims to alter system functioning
instantaneously by injecting false data [2, 3, 7–9] while maintaining undetectability under
a static model of the system. In this work, our goal is to study an application independent
stochastic system framework, and investigate a dynamic data modification attack, which
we refer to as under-the-radar attack. The key intuition behind the study of this class of
attacks is the following. In a dynamic framework, every action of the adversary causes
an instantaneous loss in utility and simultaneously results in an altering of the system
dynamics as perceived by the physical system controller. Consequently, if the controller
has prior knowledge of the typical system dynamics, the change in posterior distribution
of incoming data can be used effectively to detect the presence of the adversary. From the
adversary’s perspective, there are two factors to balance, the tangible reward due to loss in
system utility and detectability factor which we measure using a distance metric between
5
the prior and posterior dynamics. Note that the problem as studied here is one of privacy
as desired by the adversary while still compromising the operation of the system. Specifi-
cally, we present a framework to characterize the tradeoff between the utility loss and the
Kullback-Liebler distance between the prior and posterior probability distributions of the
captured stream. The K-L distance (or information divergence) is an accepted measure
of detectability in hypothesis testing problems [10], and in this work, the detection of the
presence or absence of the adversary can be viewed as a hypothesis testing problem as
conducted by the control system under attack.
In this work, Markovian dynamics are used to model the prior distribution of the dis-
crete time stochastic process representing the incoming data. In recent years Markov mod-
els and in particular discrete time Markov decision processes have been used to model CPSs
such as autonomous driving [11] and water monitoring systems [12]. Classical Markov
modeled systems such as Linear Quadratic Gaussian control systems (which have broad
applicability to CPS), when discretized would also fit the work in this paper. Within the
framework of MDPs, part of the data is vulnerable to be modified by the adversary who is
aware of the prior dynamics and the detectability threshold of the controller. Under this
model, the contributions of the paper are as follows. When the adversary has complete
control of the incoming data, or if the state evolution is independent of input, the problem
is reduced to a linearly solvable control problem as studied in [13] which provides an exact
characterization of the adversary’s optimal strategy and the optimal tradeoff between de-
tectability and utility loss. For a general Markovian model, the optimal solution requires
the solution of a continuous action Markov Decision Process (MDP) which become com-
putationally impractical as the time horizon increases. For the general case, an achievable
tradeoff between detectability and tangible rewards is presented using a greedy heuristic
which can be characterized analytically. The proposed model is applied to a networking
problem of practical interest, wherein an adversary modifies the timing of an incoming
packet stream to a router so as to determine the flow of packets downstream from the
router. This problem is studied from the adversary perspective wherein the goal is to
balance two costs– the adversary’s privacy cost measured by the K-L divergence and the
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network privacy cost measured by the maximum length of the packet stream whose paths
can be hidden by a memory limited router. In this example, it is shown that the general
formulation is solvable and yields the optimal adversary strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is described in Section
1.2. When the inputs follow an i.i.d arrival distribution, the optimal tradeoffs between
utility and K-L divergence, and the optimal adversary policies are derived in Section 1.3.
When the inputs follow Markovian dynamics, or an internal controller state is included
in the formulation, the tradeoffs and policies are presented in Section 1.4. The network
anonymity application is described and solved in detail in Section 1.5, followed by con-
cluding remarks in Section 1.6.
1.1.1 Related Work
The study of false data injection in cyber physical systems has focused on specific
applications, most notably, power systems or the smart grid. Attacks on power system
state estimation, such as compromising phasor measurement unit (PMU) data streams,
has drawn a lot of recent attention due to its potential impact to cripple a national in-
frastructure. A good majority of the studies have considered “one-shot” attacks [2, 3],
wherein an adversary identifies the minimum number of data sources to compromise such
that the system moves to an alternate state than the actual one, whilst maintaining per-
fect complete undetectability of his presence. The undetectability results typically rely on
the internal security and stability assessment utilizing static estimation techniques. Intro-
ducing dynamics into the security measures can significantly improve the detectability of
one-shot attacks. For instance, [14–16] consider continuous-time power system models and
apply dynamic techniques to detect malicious data injection. In [15], an accurate power
network descriptor model is used and necessary and sufficient conditions for identifiability
of attacks based on the network topology are derived, and in [7] dynamic detection and
identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory are proposed to de-
tect power network component failure due to false data injection. Dynamic data injection
attacks were also studied in the context of linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) systems [8,9],
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wherein the authors study estimation and control when some of the sensors or actuators
are corrupted by an attacker with an application in power networks. Specifically, they
are concerned with the number of attacks or errors that can be detected and corrected
within a specified time as a function of the parameters of system dynamics. They char-
acterize fundamental limits on undetectability of attacks and also provide a secure local
control loop design that can make the system more resilient to these attacks. Note that
the work in [7–9, 17, 18] also study the problem of false data injection in dynamical sys-
tems (LQG controllers and Kalman filter based estimation systems) which is thematically
similar to our work. Part of the focus there is on understanding system properties that
enable detection of the best adversary over a period of time. A key difference between our
model and the work in these references is the MDP model is an open-loop model based on
finite state probabilistic automatons whereas LQG and Kalman filter based systems are
feedback controllers working with real valued parameters.
Yet another specific application where false data injection has been studied theoreti-
cally is the introduction of Byzantine data in Bayesian distributed detection [19, 20]. In
Bayesian distributed detection, a group of sensors transmit observations to a fusion center
which uses the received data to perform a hypothesis testing problem on the underlying
source of observations. In the Byzantine version of the problem explored in [19, 20], the
authors included an adversary who compromised a fraction of sensors and determined the
most effective attacking strategy of the Byzantine nodes that limits the hypothesis testing
performance. Their approach was based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) as a prob-
abilistic distance between the legitimate and Byzantine data, and aims to maximize the
performance of Bayesian detection under a limited Byzantine attack assuming the attack
is undetectable and the data are independent across time. While our proposed approach
is also based on using an informational distance measure to quantify the deviation of
data from the legitimate statistical prior, it is used to study the tension from the adver-
sary perspective between preserving his detectability and ability to reduce system utility.
The critical challenge in our work is the dynamic nature of the system and the acausal
relationship between the key variables in the system.
8
Figure 1.1: System Model
The problem as we explore in this article is similar to a class of cyberattacks referred to
by the mnemonic “Frog-Boiling” [21,22], wherein typical intrusion and anomaly detectors
of network traffic are fooled by modifying the data streams gradually so that detectors
that can maintain limited history of data fail to detect the anomalies built up over several
time steps. The work we present here is a theoretical foundational approach operating on
the same principle.
1.2 Mathematical Model
Data Arrival Inputs arrive to the controller according to a discrete time stochastic
process with wide sense stationary Markovian dynamics. We specifically divide the input
into two separate streams X = X1, X2, · · · and Y = Y1, Y2, · · · wherein the pair (xn, yn) ∈
X×Y denotes the input data at time step n. X,Y represent the legitimate inputs, wherein
the initial pair x0, y0 is fixed and the inputs at subsequent time points are distributed
according to the stationary transition probability matrix Pst = {pij|kli, k ∈ X , j, l ∈ Y}
and Pr{Xn+1 = k, Yn+1 = l|Xn = i, Yn = j} = pij|kl for all n. We represent the inputs by
a pair of streams X,Y to separate the stream X which can be modified by the adversary
from the stream Y which is not accessible to him. In practice, the stream Y could denote
information flowing through protected data links, or internal system information that is
unavailable to the adversary.
Controller Reward The underlying physical system receives the inputs and performs
actions that result in a utility value, denoted by a function u : X × Y → R+. In prac-
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tice, the underlying system has an internal state and, depending on the history, current
inputs and state, the controller takes an appropriate action that maximizes the net util-
ity achieved. In this work, our goal is to study the adversarial perspective, and for this
purpose the internal actions and internal state of the controller are abstracted into the in-
stantaneous utility function u(·, ·). In section 1.4 we will include an explicit internal state
variable in the model and derive the corresponding solutions. The controller is equipped
with an intrusion detection mechanism whose goal is to identify the presence or absence
of adversarial modification using prior knowledge of the legitimate input dynamics.
Adversary The adversary is assumed to have complete access to the data stream X,
wherein the data can be modified without restriction prior to being received by the con-
troller. For most of our subsequent results we shall assume that the adversary can observe
the stream Y but not modify the data on it. We denote the modified input stream by
Xˆ = Xˆ1, Xˆ2, · · · ; the adversary’s goal is to generate the modified stream Xˆ such that the
net utility of the controller is minimized whilst remaining stealthy of the intrusion detec-
tion mechanism described thenceforth. We assume, for the most part, that the adversary
is privy to the internal state process of the controller 1.
Intrusion Detection The controller is equipped with an intrusion detection mechanism
which is modeled as a hypothesis testing between the presence and absence of the ad-
versary. Specifically, the mechanism uses the observed inputs Xˆ,Y for the statistical
inference. In this work we do not explicitly model the hypothesis testing, but instead use
the Kullback-Liebler divergence between the posterior distribution of (Xˆ,Y) generated by
the adversary and the prior distribution P as a measure of detectability of the adversary’s
presence. It is well known that under constraints on the false alarm probability, the K-L
distance thus computed bounds the probability of missed-detection which the adversary
aims to maximize.
Adversary Policy and Net Reward Under this system model, the action of the ad-
1When the state transitions are deterministic functions of the inputs, state and action, the adversary
can infer the states even if he cannot ”observe” them
10
versary is modeled by the causal conditional distribution:
Pˆ(Xˆ1, Xˆ2, · · · |X1, Y1, X2, Y2, · · · ) =
Pr{Xˆ1|X1, Y1}Pr{Xˆ2|Xˆ1, X2, Y2, X1, Y1} · · ·
which we denote using the policy notation µ. For an n step process, the adversary’s goal is
to design a policy that maximizes the net reward measured by a weighted sum of the utility
of the controller and the K-L divergence between the posterior and prior distributions,
given by
R(µ) =
n∑
i=1
λ
[
E(u(Xˆi, Yi))
]
+ (1− λ)D(Pˆ||P)
where D(Pˆ||P) =
∑
(x,y)∈Xn×Yn
Pr{Xˆ = x,Y = y} log
[
Pr{Xˆ = x,Y = y}
Pr{X = x,Y = y}
]
is the K-L divergence between the posterior and prior distributions of the observed inputs.
The goal of the adversary is to design the policy µ∗ that maximizes the above reward.
Inherent in the above discussion is the fact that it is in the adversary’s best interests to
chose the optimal policy µ∗ despite knowing that the controller is aware of the optimal
policy µ∗ and can design a detector that uses the observed inputs to identify whether the
inputs were generated using the prior distribution or the posterior distribution (that is an
outcome of the known optimal policy µ∗).
In practice, the optimal distribution qn is used to randomly generate a specific action
(choice of input Xˆn) which results in a specific utility and K-L cost achieved by the
adversary, which when averaged over the ensemble provides the derived optimal reward.
The controller, knowing that the adversary– if he exists– is likely to use the optimal
strategy, would perform the hypothesis testing accordingly and flag an alert if the detection
metric exceeds a certain threshold. The controller’s hypothesis testing is not explicitly
considered in this work, but instead abstracted using the K-L distance.
We note that K-L distance requires that the posterior distribution is absolutely con-
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tinuous with respect to the prior, which in essence limits the adversarial strategies. If the
absolute continuity condition were violated, or in other words, the adversary transmitted
an input that were not in the prior support, then the presence of the adversary would be
revealed instantly, and consequently such scenarios are not considered in this work.
Based on the described model, in the next section, we characterize explicitly the opti-
mal policy of the adversary when the incoming process is i.i.d, and subsequently extend
the results for the general Markovian model and when an internal state process is included
in Section 1.4. The optimal solution to the general process is expressed as a solution to a
continuous state-action Markov Decision Process.
1.3 Optimal Tradeoff and Adversary Policy for i.i.d Input
Streams
We first consider a simple system where the inputs to the controller is temporally an
i.i.d. process. Mathematically, Pr(Xn, Yn | Xn−1, Yn−1, · · ·) = Pr(Xn, Yn). As mentioned
in the mathematical model, the instantaneous cost incurred by the adversary in the process
is composed of the utility cost and the detectability cost. While the utility cost is a function
of instantaneous inputs, u(Xn, yn)(adversary absent) or u(Xˆn, yn)(adversary present), the
penalty due to the data modification is measured by the K-L divergence. When the input
sequence is i.i.d, the K-L divergence between the distributions P and Pˆ can be split as:
D(Pˆ||P) =
n∑
i=1
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Pr{Xˆi = x, Yi = y}×
log
[
Pr{Xˆi = x, Yi = y}
Pr{Xi = x, Yi = y}
]
which is a sum of causal independent terms across time steps. Inherent in the above ex-
pansion is the fact that the adversary also chooses a policy independent across time steps.
Without proof, we state that this is optimal since the adversary has nothing to gain from
a utility perspective using the memory of past actions and the K-L divergence between the
distribution of an i.i.d sequence and that of a sequence with memory is higher than that
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between two i.i.d sequences generated using the marginal distributions. As the compro-
mised input at any given time Xˆn has dependency only with the inaccessible input Yn, the
action to change the probability distribution of Xˆn is a conditional probability Pr{Xˆn|yn}.
The unchanged joint probability Pr{Xn, Yn} and changed probability Pr{Xˆn|yn} in the
analysis below are denoted as p(X,Y ) and q(Xˆ) respectively. In the following, the optimal
adversary behavior is analyzed depending on whether the adversary can observe the data
arriving from input stream Y or not.
1.3.1 Scenario I: Analysis with Perfect Side Information
Theorem 3.1 Let V ∗n denote the optimal weighted cost as a function of the inputs
xn, yn realized from the random input variables Xn, Yn at time n. Then
V ∗n = −(1− λ) log(Ep(xˆ|yn)
[
exp(
−λ
1− λu(xˆ, yn))
]
), xˆ ∈ X (1.1)
where the optimal action of the adversary is given by
q∗(xˆ) =
p(xˆ | yn) exp( −λ
1− λu(xˆ, yn))
Γiid1
, xˆ ∈ X (1.2)
where Γiid1 is the normalization constant.
Proof: Since the inputs are i.i.d and there is no memory utilized in the system dynamics,
the optimal cost V ∗n at time n as a function of the inputs is given by solving the the greedy
optimality equation from the expected cost-to-go function:
V ∗n = min
q(xˆ)
[
λ
∑
xˆ
q(xˆ)u(xˆ, yn)+
(1− λ)
∑
xˆ
q(xˆ) log
(
q(xˆ)
p(xˆ | yn)
)]
, xˆ ∈ X
The minimization uses the idea of K-L minimization similar to linearly solvable control
in [13] to derive the optimal policy and cost. The proof details are provided in the appendix
as a corollary to the proof of Theorem 4.1 2.
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1.3.2 Scenario II:Analysis with Unobservable Side Information
When the side information is observable to the adversary, the achieved utility when
the adversary throws away the legitimate input and generates an input with identical
distribution to the prior would be perfectly undetectable (and no utility change either)
which is a consequence of the use of expected rewards as a metric. For there to be a
difference between two sources of input using identical distributions, one legitimate and
the other illegal, there ought to be side information related to the actual input which can
be used to measure the deviation. The unmodified input stream Y can be viewed as this
side information which the controller can use to track the possibly modified input stream
X. In particular, when the side information (or state) is not observable to the adversary,
his ability to maintain his “stealthiness” is likely to reduce further. In the scenario where
the adversary is not able to eavesdrop on input stream Y, only prior knowledge of the
probability distribution of Yn can be used to derive the optimal policy and cost. Since
the prior distribution of Yn is a fixed i.i.d distribution dependent on the observed input
Xn, the optimal action at time n is also dependent on the observed input Xn at time n.
In the expression below, q(Xˆ) refers to Pr(Xˆ|Xn) and xˆ ∈ X . Since the adversary cannot
observe Yn, at best he can compute the marginal distribution of Xˆn from the controller’s
perspective using his belief about Yn given the observed Xn. In other words, if
pi(xˆ) = Ep(Y |xn)p(xˆ | Y )
then the K-L divergence between posterior and prior as computed by the adversary is
given by
D(Pˆ‖P) = D(q(xˆ)‖pi(xˆ))
The cost minimization function can be written as
min
q(xˆ)
[
λEq(xˆ)Ep(Y |xn)u(xˆ, Y ) + (1− λ)D(q(xˆ)‖pi(xˆ)))
]
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Theorem 3.2 When the adversary cannot observe the input sequence Y, the optimal
cost
V¯ ∗n = −(1− λ) log
(
Epi(xˆ)
[
exp(
−λ
1− λ
∑
Y
p(Y | xn)u(xˆ, Y ))
])
(1.3)
and the optimal action to obtain above cost is given by
q∗(xˆ) =
pi(xˆ) exp(
−λ
1− λ
∑
Y p(Y | Xn)u(xˆ, Y ))
Γiid2
(1.4)
where Γiid2 is the normalization constant.
Proof: The proof follows a similar optimization technique as in Theorem 4.1 2.
Note that when side information is available, the optimal adversary strategy does not
depend on the original data Xn. This is a virtue of the i.i.d assumption wherein if the
adversary were to choose a policy dependent on the original data X, through a conditional
distribution Pr{Xˆn|Xn, Yn}, since the controller does not have access to the original data,
the cost function would only be expressed as an expectation over the original data in
which case, an equal cost can be obtained using the marginal policy Pr{Xˆn|Yn}. However,
when side information is unavailable, the optimal action and tradeoff is dependent on the
observed input Xn since the observed input provides information about the unobservable
input which in turn influences the expected costs at that time step.
A simple example to illustrate the trade off between the utility cost and detectabil-
ity cost performed on a binary input model in Figure 1.2. The input tuple (Xi, Yi) ∈
({0, 0}, {0, 1}, {1, 0}, {1, 1}) is generated randomly from an arbitrary joint probability dis-
tribution Pr(x = 0, y = 0) = 0.1546, Pr(x = 0, y = 1) = 0.1546, Pr(x = 1, y = 0) =
0.2989 and Pr(x = 1, y = 1) = 0.2856. The Utility function of the input tuple (Xi, Yi) is
defined as
u(Xi, Yi) =

−1, if Xi = 0, Yi = 0
−0.75, if Xi = 1, Yi = 1
−0.50, if Xi = 1, Yi = 0
−0.25, if Xi = 0, Yi = 1
By spanning the optimization across different values of λ, a tradeoff between the utility
and detectability can be obtained, which is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Trade Off Between Utility and Detectability in scenario 1 and 2(i.i.d input
process)
As observed when adversary chooses to remain completely private (K-L cost is 0), the
achieved utility does not depend on whether the adversary can observe the input Y or
not. Since maximum stealth (minimum detectability) implies that the adversary retains
the prior distribution of inputs, this observation follows. As expected, the tradeoff for
the perfect side information is an inner bound on the tradeoff when side information is
not observable. This is true mathematically; when optimizing the policy with perfect
side information, the adversary can choose to ignore the available information to derive a
sub-optimal policy. We shall use this argument to derive an inner bound for the general
Markovian framework.
1.4 Adversary Policy and Cost under general Markovian
Framework
1.4.1 Continuous State-Action general MDP Formulation for Markov
Inputs and Utility independent of Controller’s State
In the general Markovian framework, the adversary can arguably use the complete
history (until time n− 1) of the original and modified data sequence when designing the
policy for state at time period n. However, we will present an argument that the ad-
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versary’s state can be effectively captured using four variables namely Xˆn−1, Yn−1, Xn, Yn.
First, for any adversary policy that utilizes data variables for any time steps prior to n−1,
the total accrued utility reward can be equivalently obtained using the marginal distri-
bution conditioned only on the present variables. Second, due to the Markovian nature
of the incoming data, the difference in K-L rewards between the original policy and the
marginalized policy is always positive (since mutual information is always greater than
zero). Consequently it is sufficient for the adversary to design a Markov policy based on
one step memory alone.
For such a Markovian policy, the K-L cost can be split into a sum of causal rewards
as D(Pˆ||P) =
n∑
i=1
∑
(x,x′,y,y′)∈X 2×Y2
Pr{Xˆi = x, Yi = y|Xˆi−1 = x′, Yi−1 = y′}
× log
[
Pr{Xˆi = x, Yi = y|Xˆi−1 = x′, Yi−1 = y′}
Pr{Xi = x, Yi = y|Xi−1 = x′, Yi−1 = y′}
]
The reader must note that the inputs at time n , Xn and Yn are only a part of the
information to define the state of the adversary process. The state of the adversary will
consist of the current value of input Yn and Xn(original), input Xˆn−1(changed) and Yn−1
in the previous time step. Note that in the i.i.d case, the original data Xn was not included
in the decision making due to the nature of the K-L cost which results in an expectation
over the original data and is thus not necessary. However, under Markovian dynamics, the
present value of Xn is required for the adversary to estimate the expected future rewards
which are a function of Xn+1, Yn+1 which in turn depend on the current Xn through the
Markov transition probability matrix.
Optimal Tradeoff and Adversary Policy with perfect side information
The formulation of a finite horizon general MDP with continuous-state action will
require following definitions:
• Decision Epoch: N = {1, 2, . . . , n, . . . , L}, L <∞
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• Adversary State: Zn ∈ Z = {S2×T 2} such that Zn = (Xn, Yn, Xˆn−1, Yn−1). The
outcomes of the random state observed at any particular time step n, i.e. zn =
(xn, yn, xˆn−1, yn−1) is sufficient information available to the adversary.
• Action: Continuous action space qn ∈ [0, 1] such that qn : Z→ Pr(Xˆn ∈ X : Xˆn =
xn). is the probability mass function for the changed input Xˆn that depends on the
current process state Zn.
• Transition Probability Function: F(z′n+1 | zn, qn) = ˜P× qn is the controlled
transition of current state Zn = (Xn, Yn, Xˆn−1, Yn−1) to next state Zn+1 =
(Xn+1, Yn+1, Xˆn, Yn) on applying an action qn, where the tilde denotes that a matrix
operation is done to exchange the 2nd element in the vector resulting from P×qn with
the last one. Recollect that P is the stationary transition probability of uncontrolled
markov chain describing the arrival of inputs from streams X and Y.
• Instantaneous Cost Function: Cqnn is the weighted sum of the utility cost and
the detectability cost for the adversary given by
Cqnn = λEqn(xˆ)u(xˆ, yn) + (1− λ)×D(qn(xˆ)‖pX(xˆ))
where
pX(xˆ) = Pr{Xn = xˆ|Yn = yn, Xn−1 = xˆn−1, Yn−1 = yn−1}
is the conditional probability based on the prior distribution. While the state is
known to the adversary, the utility cost is an expectation over the action qn in
the problem formulation. The adversary uses the optimal probability distribution,
qn(Xˆn) and randomly picks a value of Xˆn = xn at each time step which achieves the
derived reward in an expected sense.
Having defined the problem at every time step, we can make a finite horizon stochastic
planning of the best possible actions or a policy µ = {q0, q1, · · · qn, · · · , qL} for L time
epochs to minimize the total expected cost.
Theorem 4.1 When the input sequence Y is perfectly observable to the adversary, let
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V ∗n denote the optimal cost-to-go at time step n. Then the optimal cost for the weighted
optimization at time step n is given by
Vn
∗(zn) =− (1− λ)log
(
EpX(xˆ)
[
exp(
−λ
1− λu(xˆ, yn))×
exp
(−EP[Vn+1∗(Zn+1)]
1− λ
)])
and the optimal action is given by
qn
∗(xˆn) =
pX(xˆ)exp
( −1
1− λ(λu(xˆ, yn) + EP[Vn+1
∗(Zn+1)])
)
Γm1
where Γm1 is the normalization constant.
Proof: The recursive Bellman equation for finite horizon case is given by
V ∗n (zn) = minqn{Cqnn + EqnEPV ∗n+1(Zn+1)}
The reduction of the above equation to the form in the theorem is provided in the
appendix. 2.
Optimal Tradeoff and Adversary Policy with unobservable side information
When the realizations of input sequence Y are unobservable to the adversary, the
state, as defined in the general MDP problem is not completely observable and therefore,
the process is similar to a partially observable Markov Decision Process. Accordingly, the
adversary maintains a belief vector over Y using the data sequence from input stream X.
If the prior belief (prior to observing Xn) and posterior belief (after observing Xn) of Yn
at any time step n are given by pin(yn) and pin,po(yn) respectively, the belief updates in
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step n are as follows:
pin(yn)
=
∑
y
pin−1(y) Pr{Yn = yn|Xn−1 = xn−1, Yn−1 = y}
pin,po(yn)
=
∑
y pin−1(y) Pr{Xn = xn, Yn = yn|Xn−1 = xn−1, Yn−1 = y}∑
y,y′ pin−1(y) Pr{Xn = xn, Yn = y′|Xn−1 = xn−1, Yn−1 = y}
In place of the variables Yn, Yn−1 which are unavailable, the sufficient state for the adver-
sary is constituted by the pair of beliefs pin−1,po, pin,po along with the observed variables
Xn, Xn−1Xˆn−1. Conditioned on this new state, which we denote by the random variable
ζn (realization ϑn), the adversary modifies the probability distribution function of Xˆn,
which we denote by qn(xˆ). As with the i.i.d model when the side information was unavail-
able to the adversary, the best he can do is to compute the K-L divergence between the
modified and unmodified marginal distributions. In effect, the single step K-L cost for the
adversary can be written as D(qn(xˆ) | pn(xˆ)) where
pn(xˆ) =∑
y,y′
pin−1,po(y′)pin,po(y) Pr{Xn = xˆ|Yn = y′, Xn−1 =
xˆn−1, Yn−1 = y}
Employing this cost into the backward induction mechanism, we get the following theorem
for the optimal cost-to-go function.
Theorem 4.2: The optimal weighted reward at time step n for the general Markovian
input system when side information is unobservable is given by
Vn
∗(ϑn) =− (1− λ)log(Epn(xˆ)[exp(
−λ
1− λEpin,po(Yn)
[u(xˆ, Yn)])× exp(
−Epin,po [EP[Vn+1∗(ζn+1)]
1− λ )])
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by taking optimal action qn
∗(xˆ) =
pn(xˆ)[U(λ, xˆ)exp(
−Epin,po [EP[Vn+1∗(ζn+1)]
1− λ )]
Γm2
where Γm2 is the normalization constant
and,
U(λ, xˆ) = exp( −λ
1− λEpin,po(Yn)[u(xˆ, Yn)])
Proof: The optimal cost for the weighted optimization when side information is unavail-
able to the adversary is given by the solution to the recursive Bellman equation for the
finite horizon case
Vn(ζn) = minqn{Cqnn + Epin,poEqnEPVn+1(ζn+1)}
where
Cqnn = λEqnEpipo(Yn)[u(xˆ, Yn)] + (1− λ)D(qn(xˆ) | pn(xˆ)).
The rest of the proof relies on the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 2
Although backward induction can be used to solve for the optimal policy and actions
as a function of the belief and state, this process is computationally impractical for more
than a few time steps due to uncountable belief space (simplex over Y). In the subsequent
section, we therefore briefly discuss methodologies to compute bounds on the optimal
tradeoff that are computationally feasible.
Outer bound on the optimal tradeoff
Any sub optimal policy for the adversary would result in an outer bound on the
tradeoff between utility and detectability costs. We propose the computation of an outer
bound using a greedy heuristic wherein the adversary chooses an action distribution qn
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that optimizes the instantaneous rewards and ignores the rewards in future time steps.
When side information is unobservable, the one-step greedy policy when applied yields
the optimal cost as
Vn
∗(ϑn)
= −(1− λ) log
(
Epn(xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λEpin,po(Yn)[u(xˆ, Yn)]
)])
which depends on the belief over Yn. The action probability to achieve the optimal greedy
cost turns out to be
q∗n(xˆ) =
pn(xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λEpin,po(Yn)[u(xˆ, Yn)]
)]
Epn(xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λEpipo(Yn)[u(xˆ, Yn)]
)]
Since the greedy policy only maximizes instantaneous rewards, it can be causally
computed (no backward induction) at every time step and is easy to implement.
Inner bound on the optimal tradeoff
Note that when the side information is observable, a sub optimal adversary can choose
to ignore the available information, and any policy thus derived will obtain a tradeoff worse
than the optimal adversary who uses the available side information. Stated differently,
the optimal tradeoff derived for the adversary with perfect side information will serve as
an inner bound to evaluate any policy derived for the adversary without side information,
for instance, the greedy policy described above.
We illustrate these ideas for the general MDP framework by taking an example of
binary model. The input space and utility functions are defined exactly as in the i.i.d
binary input model. The 4× 4 stationary transition probability matrix P for the input is
chosen to have a form

α β γ δ
α γ β δ
β α δ γ
β α γ δ

.
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Figure 1.3: Trade Off Between Utility and Detectability for markov input process after
greedy policy under scenario I when there is perfect side information(input Y known)
and scenario II when there is no side information(input Y not known) and after upper
bound under scenario I
For simulation, the value of α, β, γ, δ are arbitrarily assigned as 0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4 respec-
tively. The tradeoff for the greedy policy when side information is unavailable is compared
with the optimal tradeoff when side information is available. The results are plotted in
Figure 1.3.
1.4.2 Continuous State-Action general MDP Formulation for I.I.D in-
puts with Controller’s Internal State Evolution Observable
There has been no notion of Controller’s State in the theoretical analysis so far. We
have only considered a stylized model of the controlled dynamical system in which the
incoming data to the controller directly results in its utility. In typical cyber physical
systems, controllers have internal state processes which evolve as functions of the inputs
and controller actions. In this section, we expand our analysis by modeling the inter-
nal state process of the controller using Markovian dynamics. Specifically, the physical
system has an instantaneous internal state St at time instant t, where St ∈ S is a dis-
crete random variable. The system receives the inputs and performs actions that result
in an internal state transition, which is denoted by the stationary transition probability
wx,y(s
′, s) = Pr(Sn+1 = s′ | Sn = s,Xn = x, Yn = y). As mentioned in Section 1.2, the op-
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timal controller policy (actions) are assumed to be solved for (and history independent 2),
and consequently the transition probability can be denoted using an action independent
distribution wx,y(s
′, s). Likewise, the utility is also dependent on the controller’s state Sn
along with the inputs at time step n and is denoted as u(Sn, Xn, Yn). Note that when the
internal state process is part of the system dynamics, there is a Markovian evolution even
with i.i.d inputs. In the following analysis, we shall consider the two input sequences to
be i.i.d in nature and have a joint distribution p(X,Y ). The adversary also has complete
information about the input sequences and the internal state sequence.
We note that the term state used in the paper denotes the state of the adversary’s
optimization. We shall continue to use it thus and apply the terminology “internal state”
to denote the internal state of the controller. The state of the adversary in this model at
time n is (Sn, Yn) due to the i.i.d assumption. The value of original input variable Xn is
irrelevant for the identical reason as stated in the beginning of Section III. In the following
we derive the optimal policy and action for the internal state based model.
Theorem 4.3: When the internal state is observable to adversary, the optimal cost for the
weighted optimization is given by
Vn
∗(sn, yn)
=− (1− λ) log
(
EpX(xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λu(sn, xˆ, yn)
)
×
exp
(−Ewxˆ,ynEP)[V ∗n+1(Sn+1, Yn+1)]
1− λ
)])
and the optimal action
qn
∗(xˆ) =
p(xˆ) exp
( −λ
1− λu(sn, xˆ, yn)
)
exp
( −H
1− λ
)
EpX(xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λu(sn, xˆ, yn)
)
exp
( −H
1− λ
)]
where H = Ewxn,ynEP[Vn+1
∗(Yn+1, Sn+1)]
2For finite horizon systems with bounded rewards, the conditions for history independence can be found
in [23]
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Proof: The recursive Bellman’s equation for finite horizon case is given by
Vn(sn, yn) = min
qn
{λEqn(Xˆ)[u(sn, xˆ, yn)] + (1− λ)×
D(qn(xˆ) ||pX(xˆ))+
∑
sn+1
∑
xˆ
∑
yn+1
[wxn,yn(sn+1, sn)qn(xˆ)
pY (yn+1)Vn+1(sn+1, yn+1)]}
and the rest of the proof is a straightforward extension of Theorem 4.1. 2
Note that although the inputs are i.i.d, the optimal solution requires a backward
induction as stated in the theorem. This is, as mentioned earlier, an outcome of the state
introducing temporal dependency across the adversarial actions. That being said, the
availability of the state information results in a straightforward optimization of the action
and the cost-to-go function in the Bellman equation.
1.4.3 Continuous State-Action general MDP Formulation for I.I.D. in-
puts with Controller’s Internal State Evolution Unobservable
When the controller’s internal state is unobservable to adversary, the overall adversary
state is (pin(Sn), Yn)) that includes the adversary’s belief pin(Sn) = Pr{Sn|Y n1 , Xˆn1 } over
the controller’s state Sn. Based on this prior belief and the input Yn observed, the ad-
versary modifies the input to Xˆ using a probability distribution conditioned on the state
(pin(Sn), yn)), which we denote by qn(xˆ). Due to the adversarial data modification, the in-
stantaneous utility cost as measurable by the adversary is given by EpinEqn [u(Sn, Xˆn, yn)].
Since there is no feedback from the state evolution to the input process, the adversary,
unlike in the situation with unobservable side information, is not required to maintain a
prior and posterior belief. The present input yn, modified input xˆn and the belief over
present state pin can be used to obtain the belief of the state in the subsequent step as:
pin+1(sn+1) =
∑
s
pin(s)wxˆn,yn(sn+1, s)
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The optimal adversary cost from the weighted optimization is given by the solution to the
recursive Bellman equation for finite horizon case of non-observable controller’s state and
i.i.d input process
Vn(pin, yn)=min
qn
{λEpinEqn(Xˆ)[u(Sn, Xˆ, yn)]+
(1− λ)D(qn(xˆ) |p(x)) + EpinEqnEPV ∗n+1(pin+1, Yn+1)}
When the state is unobservable to the adversary, the problem of reducing the Bell-
man equation beyond its stated form above is as yet intractable. The primary difference
between unobservable state and unobservable side information (under Markovian dynam-
ics) is the fact that unlike the side information which evolves as an uncontrolled Markov
chain with fixed transition probability, the state evolution depends on the adversary ac-
tion through the modified input process Xˆ. Consequently the minimization in the Bellman
equation is complicated by the non-standard dependence between the action and subse-
quent belief. We can however derive inner and outer bounds on the optimal tradeoff as was
done in Section 1.4.1. An outer bound can be obtained using the greedy heuristic, wherein
the action is applied to maximize the expected instantaneous reward. The optimal value
function obtained on applying greedy policy is
Vn
∗ = −(1− λ) log
(
EpX(Xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λEpipr(S)u(S, Xˆ, yn)
)])
which is obtained by applying an optimal action probability
q(xˆ) = pX(xˆ)
exp
( −λ
1− λEpin(Sn)u(Sn, xˆ, yn)
)
EpX(Xˆ)
[
exp
( −λ
1− λEpin(S)u(S, Xˆ, yn)
)] .
While the greedy policy provides an outer bound, the optimal tradeoff between utility and
detectability cost for the adversary who can perfectly observe the state would serve as an
inner bound to the tradeoff when the state is not observable.
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Thus far in the preceding discussion we have considered the optimal action and the
detectability-utility cost tradeoff for the adversary under different scenarios. In the most
general model, wherein the inputs are Markovian and the internal state and side infor-
mation are not observable to the adversary, the resulting optimization would combine the
POMDP framework as described in Section 4 with the state evolution factor described
above; since further simplification of the Bellman equation is intractable as yet, this has
been omitted here for ease of presentation. In the rest of this work, we present in detail, a
practical example of an internal state based system which can be solved analytically using
recursive optimization.
We consider the binary example in Section III and introduce an internal state whose
transitions occur with arriving inputs. Let the controller exist in two states, denoted by
S1 and S2. The state transition occurs as follows.
If X = Y ,
p 1− p
q 1− q
 And, if X 6= Y
1− p p
1− q q
 where p=0.2 and q=0.3.
Adversary cost is defined as
C=

−0.9, if Sn = S1andXn = Yn
−0.1, if Sn = S1andXn 6= Yn
−0.6, if Sn = S2andXn = Yn
−0.4, if Sn = S2andXn 6= Yn
where Xn and Yn are the inputs arrived at controller
at time n.
Figure 1.4 plots the optimal tradeoff between utility and detectability for the adversary
who can observe the internal state process and the sub optimal tradeoff derived from the
greedy heuristic when the adversary cannot observe the internal state process.
1.5 Application in the study of admissible length in Anony-
mous Communication
In any datagram network, timing analysis can be used to trace flows of packets and
thus can compromise users’ anonymity [24, 25]. Specifically, the correlation between in-
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Figure 1.4: Comparison between the optimal tradeoff for an i.i.d input process when
internal state of the controller is observable, and the greedy policy tradeoff when internal
state is not observable
coming and outgoing streams at shared routers induced by the router scheduling policy
can be used to track flows from sources to corresponding destinations. On the Internet,
senders’ anonymity is achieved using networks of Chaum mixes [26]. Chaum mixes are
relay nodes or proxy servers that use a combination of encryption, packet padding and
random reordering to obfuscate the source destination information of a packet. Specifi-
cally, every user transmits packets to the desired destination through a sequence of mix
nodes. Each packet is encrypted in layers using public key encryption such that, every
mix on the path decrypts a layer of encryption, determines the identity of the subsequent
mix on the path, and transmits the packet to that mix, which in turn removes the next
layer of encryption and so on. The anonymous system Tor [27] is a popular mix network
used by more than half a million users.
Encryption and packet padding, however, serve only to limit information retrieval from
the contents of packets. To limit the information retrieval through timing analysis, mixes
typically wait until they receive packets from multiple users, randomly reorder the collected
packets and transmit them in batches, thus reducing the correlation between the timing on
incoming and outgoing flows. As expected, the anonymity achievable from timing analysis
severely deteriorates in the presence of resource constraints on the mix such as limited
memory and bandwidth. Consider a router in a data network serving packet streams from
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Figure 1.5: Mix receives packets from two users, encrypts and randomly reorders them,
and transmits them in their corresponding outgoing link. Eve observes the arrival and
departure processes.
two users with equal arrival rates as shown in Figure 1.5. If an eavesdropper does not
observe any arrival or departure process, and has no prior knowledge about the sources of
outgoing links, the probability of associating an outgoing link with any particular source
would be the prior probability (in this case 12 for each user). A mixing strategy provides
perfect anonymity, if it ensures that the probability of Eve predicting the outgoing
links of users correctly remains 12 , independent of the number of packets observed. No
mixing strategy can, however, provide perfect anonymity using a limited buffer capacity;
this can be ascertained from the fact that for a random arrival model, the probability that
the sequence of arrivals contains a preponderance of packets from a single source exceeds
the finite buffer size is non zero. A formal proof of this statement can be found in [28].
In effect, the objective of a memory limited mix is to maintain perfect anonymity
for as long as possible, whereas the objective of the adversary is to detect the source
of outgoing packets as quickly as possible. In [28], the maximum average length of the
packet stream– referred to as admissible length– for which the mix can maintain perfect
anonymity was evaluated for a variety of scenarios. In each of the scenarios, the mix’s
goal is to use a scheduling policy so that the admissible length is maximized, whereas
the adversary’s goal is to match the outgoing links with the respective sources as quickly
as possible, or in other words, reduce the admissible length. Note that the admissible
length is directly related to the duration of time before which the adversary can perfectly
match the incoming and outgoing streams. In this work, we study the admissible length
when the adversary can control the incoming timing in one of the processes3. In [31],
3This can be accomplished in a variety of ways including compromising access points, filling queues
with spurious packets, jamming acknowledgments and suchlike [29,30]
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this problem was studied when the adversary had limited ability to modify the timing
(by capturing a finite number of packets). Here we make no limiting assumptions on the
adversary ability, but instead study the problem wherein the adversary aims to optimize
the tradeoff between the admissible length and the detectability of his presence which fits
into the main theoretical model described in this work.
1.5.1 System Model
We characterize the system model under following headings:
• Arrival Process Arrival process is a discrete-time system which is independent for
both the users. For ease of understanding we refer to packets from the two users
and red and blue packets respectively. Packets arrive at each time step according
to Bernoulli process with associated probability of arrival defined below for 2 users
system.
Pr : pr = probability that a red packet arrives
1− pr = probability that a red packet does not arrive
Similarly,
Pb : pb = probability that a blue packet arrives
1− pb = probability that a blue packet does not arrive
• Chaum Mix The mix receives packets from both the users and transmits a pair
of packets, one from each user, every time the buffer contains at least one packet
from each user. The maximum number of packets that can be stored in the buffer
is m. However, when the buffer is full of packets from only one user, the mix is
forced to transmit on only one stream (and not a pair) thus revealing the source
of the outgoing stream to the adversary. The total number of slots until this event
occurs is defined as the admissible length of the system. In [28], transmitting packets
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from each user when the buffer has packets from all the users has been proved to be
optimal strategy for maximizing admissible length.
Optimal Mixing Strategy Note that the adversary determines the source of an
outgoing stream by analyzing the correlations between the timing on incoming and
outgoing streams. Consequently, as long as each outgoing stream is equally corre-
lated to all incoming streams, the system will remain in perfect anonymity (each
stream equally likely to belong to each source). More specifically, if the mix ensures
that at all times the number of departed packets on any outgoing link is less than the
minimum number of arrivals across all incoming links, then it is possible to design a
scheduling policy for all outgoing streams to have identical timing, thus maintaining
perfect anonymity. This idea was used in [28] to prove that the optimal strategy
for the mix is to transmit one packet of each user if and only if at least one packet
from each user is present in the buffer and the buffer is not full. If the buffer is full
and only packets from one user are present, then the mix is forced to transmit a
single packet, at which point any adversary can identify the source of that outgoing
stream. The expected number of slots required to reach this condition is defined as
the admissible length of the system.
• Adversary: The adversary is allowed to alter the dynamics of the red packet arrival
process. In effect the arrival probability of a red packet can be altered in every slot.
In practice this can be accomplished by capturing packets or regenerating old packets
by modifying acknowledgments. The objective of the adversary is to shorten the time
in which the buffer is filled with packets from one user only. The adversary can only
modify the red packet stream but can observe the packets on the blue packet stream.
Adversary MDP Model: By virtue of the Bernoulli arrival model and the mixing
strategy, the buffer can only contain packets from one user. Since the mixing strategy is
deterministic, the adversary can perfectly determine the number of packets present in the
mix’s buffer at every time slot. This scenario therefore falls under the observable internal
state-input adversary model described in Section 4.3. Following are the specifics of the
model as it pertains to this problem.
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Time Horizon: The time horizon is infinite but the process has a stopping condition
(when the buffer is full and a new packet arrives from the same source as that of the
packets in the buffer).
Inputs: The two input processes {Xn} and {Yn} are i.i.d Bernoulli processes with
probabilities pr and pb respectively.
Internal State: The internal state at time n is defined as the number of red packets in
the buffer or the negative of the number of blue packets in the buffer. The state transition
is deterministic given the inputs.
p(s′|s, x, y) =

1 s′ = s+ 1, s < M, x = 1, y = 0
s′ = s− 1, s > −M,x = 0, y = 1
s′ = s, x = y
s = M + 1 or s = −M − 1
Utility Cost: The utility cost measures the admissible length which is incremented by
1 at every step until the state reaches one of the boundaries M + 1 or −M − 1. In other
words
u(s, x, y) =
 1 |s| < M + 10 o.w.
At any state s, let ϕ(s) denote the utility cost-to-go in the absence of any adversarial
modification. Then, ϕ(s) can be solved using the following recursion:
ϕ(s) =prpbϕ(s)+(1− pr)(1− pb)ϕ(s)+pr(1− pb)ϕ(s+ 1)
+ (1− pr)pbϕ(s− 1) + 1
The proof of the above equation is available in [28] and is a special case of the Bellman
equation derived in Section 4 where the adversary has no actions and λ = 0. The solution
to the above recursion using boundary conditions,ϕ(m+ 1) = ϕ(−m− 1) = 0 is found to
be
ϕ(s) = 4
[
(m+ 1)2 − s2
]
(1.5)
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Now, consider a situation where adversary is allowed to change the dynamics of the
red packet stream and eavesdrops to know the arrival information of blue(B) packets at
each time step. Following the model is Section 4, the adversary’s state at time n is given
by the pair (Sn, Yn).When the current state is (s,B = 0), let the probability of a red
packet arrival (as altered by the adversary) be denoted by qr(y,B = 0) and the action
probability function Qr = [qr (1− qr)]. Similarly, when the process state is (s,B = 1), the
probability mass function is denoted as Q¯r = [q¯r (1− q¯r)]. The problem is formulated as
infinite horizon total cost MDP in which the action is continuous. Let the value function
at state (s,B) be denoted by ϑ(s,B).
The boundary conditions are then modified accordingly as ϑ(m, 0) = 0, ϑ(m+ 1, 1) = 0
ϑ(−m− 1, 0) = 0, ϑ(−m, 1) = 0
The Bellman equation to minimize the weighted cost for the adversary, following the result
in Section 4, is given by
ϑ(s, 0) = min
0≤qr≤1
[λ1{s 6= (m+1)−(m+1)} + (1− λ)D(Qr‖Pr)
+ qrpbϑ(s+ 1, 1) + qr(1− pb)ϑ(s+ 1, 0)+
(1− qr)pbϑ(s, 1) + (1− qr)(1− pb)ϑ(s, 0)]
ϑ(s, 1) = min
0≤q¯r≤1
[λ1{s 6= (m+1)−(m+1)} + (1− λ)D(Q¯r‖Pr)
+ q¯rpbϑ(s, 1) + q¯r(1− pb)ϑ(s, 0)+
(1− q¯r)pbϑ(s− 1, 1) + (1− q¯r)(1− pb)ϑ(s− 1, 0)]
where, 1{A} is the indicator function identifying even A.
Theorem 5.1 In a system of two users which generate packets with equal probability
and a chaum mix with buffer capacity m, when the adversary can control the probability
of arrival of one input stream while eavesdropping the arrival of packets from other stream,
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the admissible length is given by
ϑ(s, 0) = −2(1− λ) log (k1(m+1)(k22(m+1) − 1)
k2
2(m+1) − k12(m+1)
k1
s
+
k2
(m+1)(1− k12(m+1))
k2
2(m+1) − k12(m+1)
k2
s
)
ϑ(s, 1) = −2(1− λ) log (k1(m+1)(k22(m+1) − 1)
k2
2(m+1) − k12(m+1)
k1
s−1
+
k2
(m+1)(1− k12(m+1))
k2
2(m+1) − k12(m+1)
k2
s−1)
where,
k1 =
1 +
√
1− exp
( −λ
1− λ
)2
exp
( −λ
1− λ
) , k2 = 1−
√
1− exp
( −λ
1− λ
)2
exp
( −λ
1− λ
)
Proof: Using the technique similar to the theory developed in sec III and IV implemented
for the infinite horizon average reward MDP, the average cost to fill the mix’s buffer
starting from any buffer state is found out. Details are available in the appendix. 2
The admissible length is plotted against the detectability (K-L cost) in Figure 1.6. These
tradeoffs are plotted for different initial state of the mix’s buffer. For a system that
initializes with an empty buffer the outer curve represents the adversarial detectability-
utility tradeoff. When maximum stealth (zero detectability) of the adversary is imposed
(no detectability), the admissible length expectedly converges to the result in [28] given
by 4[(m + 1)2 − s2]. Figure 1.7 plots the admissible length as a function of the initial
buffer state; interestingly although the mix can only alter the red packet dynamics, the
admissible length-to-go as a function of the internal buffer state is symmetric– identical
stopping time regardless of whether the buffer contains blue or red packets.
A Note on Countermeasures
The natural counterpart to the adversary perspective discussed thus far in this paper is
that of the intrusion detection mechanism as implemented within the control system. To
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Figure 1.6: Utility Vs Detectability trade-off in a mix of buffer capacity m=8
Figure 1.7: Admissible length Vs buffer state y in a mix of buffer capacity m=8
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that end, Figures 1.8(a) and 1.8(b) plot the empirical K-L divergence between the observed
data pattern and the prior (or expected) data pattern. The empirical K-L divergence can
be computed using the empirical probability distribution of the state transitions on the
pair of inputs, as when compared to the underlying prior probability distribution. From
the figure one can discern that as the adversary reduces the weight on the detectability, the
detection statistics increase and consequently his actions are more detectable. As noted
in the figures, the performance by an adversary with knowledge of side information is
apparently more detectable than one without side information. The primary reason for
this is that as optimized, the utility function when side information is unavailable is taken
as expectation over all possible side information Y which limits the ability of the adversary
to increase his utility beyond a certain degree. In effect although the detectability of such
an adversary is apparently lower for the same weight, the resulting utility for the adversary
is also proportionately lower. In effect the availability of side information to the adversary
emboldens him to cause additional damage to the system albeit at the cost of higher
detectability.
Any detection mechanism that uses such an empirical statistic would likely apply a
threshold depending on its tolerance for false alarm and requirement on detection rate.
Depending on the chosen threshold, were the adversary to operate under the threshold
his actions may fall into the ”missed detection” category and he would thus remain unde-
tected, and were he to operate above the threshold his actions would be detected whilst
causing higher damage to system operation. We do note that this is a specific example
of detection statistics that can feed countermeasures but are not necessarily optimal. We
do note that when the controller is aware of the attacker’s policy, then the KL divergence
as derived by the attacker would be a tight bound assuming the controller utilizes an
optimal detection mechanism. Were the attacker to use an alternate policy (which would
have higher KL divergence than µ∗), the higher KL would result in easier detectability by
the controller.
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(a) Detection Statistics across the λ spec-
trum
(b) Detection Statistics for λ < 0.5
Figure 1.8: Empirical Kullback-Leibler Divergence as a function of weighting factor for
optimal adversarial strategies with and without side information
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we presented a model to study dynamic under-the-radar attacks by an
adversary on a dynamical system. Here, the adversary is trying to impact a system with-
out revealing his presence. Using a weighted reward that included the utility cost and the
K-L divergence, we characterized analytically, under different conditions on the underlying
system dynamics, the tradeoff between the tangible impact to the system and the adver-
sary’s “stealthiness”. For the Markovian model, we note that the independence over time
for the attacker’s policy is a mathematical consequence of the positivity of KL divergence
and the fact that the randomness in one state transition is independent of the previous.
Intuitively, were the adversary to use a strategy that wasnt memoryless, then the depen-
dency across time would serve as additional information revealing his presence. A natural
way forward beyond intrusion detection would be the design of countermeasures that alter
the controller strategy having detected the adversary presence to obtain a desired perfor-
mance whilst showing resistance to intrusion. We believe that a stochastic/multistage
game formulation that includes detection and mitigation as controller actions would serve
as a likely framework for the course of such an investigation.
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1.7 Appendices
1.7.1 Proof of theorem 3.1,4.1
It is well known that the K-L divergence between two probability distributions D(q(x) |
p(x)) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if q(x) = p(x)∀x. This follows from the fact that for
any function g : X 7→ R+,
q(x) =
g(x)∑
x g(x)
minimizes the divergence expansion:
∑
x q(x) log
q(x)
g(x) The reductions in the different proofs
in this work shall use the above as a fact. For a Markovian input stream with observable
side information:
Vn
∗ = minqn{
∑
xˆ
qn(xˆ)[λu(xˆ, yn) + (1− λ)×
log(
qn(xˆ)
pn(xˆ)
) + Epn+1(Xn+1,Yn+1)[Vn+1
∗]]}
= minqn{(1− λ)
∑
xˆ
qn(xˆ)[log(qn(xˆ)÷
(exp(
−λ
1− λu(xˆ, yn))× pn(xˆ)×
exp(
−Epn+1(Xn+1,Yn+1)[Vn+1∗]
1− λ )))]}
= minqn{(1− λ)D(qn(xˆ)‖F (xˆ))}−
(1− λ)log(Epn(xˆ)[exp(
−λ
1− λu(xˆ, yn))×
exp(
−Epn+1(Xn+1,Yn+1)[Vn+1∗]
1− λ )])
Using the optimal divergence expansion stated at the beginning of the proof, the Optimal
cost function,
Vn
∗(zn) =− (1− λ)log
(
EpX(xˆ)
[
exp(
−λ
1− λu(xˆ, yn))×
exp
(−EP[Vn+1∗(Zn+1)]
1− λ
)])
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and the optimal action is given by
qn
∗(xˆn)
=
pX(xˆ)exp
( −1
1− λ(λu(xˆ, yn) + EP[Vn+1
∗(Zn+1)])
)
∑
xˆ pX(xˆ)exp
( −1
1− λ(λu(xˆ, yn) + EP[Vn+1
∗(Zn+1)])
)
where Γm1 is the normalization constant.
Corollary We follow from the the above solution for optimal action probability when
the input stream is I.I.D in nature. In that case, the expected future reward need not be
considered to take a decision at the present state. The optimal decision for a given state
will be independent of time n. In this scenario, the formulated problem for the markov
case will be reduced to
V ∗ =minq{
∑
xˆ
q(xˆ)[λu(xˆ, yn) + (1− λ) log(q(xˆ)
p(xˆ)
)
1.7.2 Proof of theorem 5.1
We minimize
ϑ(s, 0) = min
Qr
[λ+ (1− λ)[qr[log( qr
pr
) +
pb
(1− λ)ϑ(s+ 1, 1)
+
(1− pb)
(1− λ) ϑ(s+ 1, 0)] + (1− qr)[log(
1− qr
1− pr )+
pb
(1− λ)ϑ(s, 1) +
(1− pb)
1− λ ϑ(s, 0)]]]
= λ+ (1− λ) min
Qr
[qr log(
qr
prµ1
) + (1− qr) log( 1− qr
(1− pq)µ2 )]]
= λ+ (1− λ) min
Qr
[
2∑
i=1
Qr(i) log
 Qr(i)R(i)
R(1) +R(2)
]]
− (1− λ) log(R(1) +R(2))
where µ1 = exp(
−λ
1− λ [pbϑ(s+ 1, 1) + (1− pb)ϑ(s+ 1, 0)]),µ2 = exp(
−λ
1− λ [pbϑ(s, 1) + (1−
pb)ϑ(s, 0)]), R(1) = prµ1, R(2) = (1− pr)µ2.
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The optimal value function is ϑ(s, 0) = λ − (1 − λ) log(R(1) + R(2)). when an optimal
action Qr(i) =
R(i)∑2
j=1R(j)
, i ∈ {1, 2} is applied. We can also rewrite the value function as
exp
(−ϑ∗(s, 0)
(1− λ)
)
= exp(
−λ
1− λ)[prµ1 + (1− pr)µ2] (1.6)
Similarly,
ϑ(s, 1) = min
q¯r
[λ1{s 6=(m+1),−(m+1)} + (1− λ)D(Q¯r | Pr)
+ q¯rpbϑ(s, 1) + q¯r(1− pb)ϑ(s, 0)+
(1− q¯r)pbϑ(s− 1, 1) + (1− q¯r)(1− pb)ϑ(s− 1, 0)]
gives exp
(−ϑ∗(s, 1)
(1− λ)
)
= exp(
−λ
1− λ)[prµ¯1 + (1 − pr)µ¯2] by taking optimal action Q¯(i) =
Pr(i)µ¯i
Pr(1)µ¯1 + Pr(2)µ¯2
, i ∈ {1, 2}
where Q¯(1) = qr, Q¯(2) = 1 − qr = q¯r, µ¯1 = exp[ −1
1− λ(pbϑ
∗(s, 1) + (1 − pb)ϑ∗(s, 0))] and
µ¯2 = exp[
−1
1− λ(pbϑ
∗(s− 1, 0) + (1− pb)ϑ∗(s− 1, 1))]
We are now left to solve the homogeneous non-linear recurrence equation (6) and (7).
Substituting,
αs = exp(
−ϑ(s, 0)
2(1− λ)), βs = exp(
−ϑ(s, 1)
2(1− λ)), ρ = exp(
−λ
1− λ)
for better readability and assuming pr = pb =
1
2
for the ease of solving the equations
by making them linear, we can write αs
2 =
ρ
2
(βs+1αs+1 + βs, αs) and βs
2 =
ρ
2
(βsαs +
βs−1, αs−1). However, αs2 = βs+12. Since, both αs and βs are defined as positive variables,
αs = βs+1. Replacing the βs+1 with αs and βs with αs−1 in equation 5 gives
αs =
ρ
2
(αs+1 + αs−1)
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The general solution of the above linear homogeneous recurrence equation is
αs = B1k1
s +B2k2
s
where k1 =
1 +
√
1− ρ2
ρ
, k2 =
1−
√
1− ρ2
ρ
. Using the boundary conditions, we deter-
mine unknown coefficients to beB1 =
k1
(m+1)(k2
2(m+1) − 1)
k2
2(m+1) − k12(m+1)
, B2 =
k2
(m+1)(1− k12(m+1))
k2
2(m+1) − k12(m+1)
.
This gives the values of ϑ(s, 0) and ϑ(s, 1).
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Chapter 2
Prospects of Wave Power Grid
Integration
2.1 Introduction
The abundance of ocean wave energy resources and their free availability have long
brought interest into exploring new ways to harness their energy efficiently and profitably.
The development of wave energy production towards its commercialization, however, is
still in its infancy. In the seventies, key theoretical studies on wave power extraction
were conducted and efforts were initiated to design and improve wave energy converter
devices. Development suffered a deceleration after a few years when other means of energy
became more lucrative for investment. Wind and solar technologies had a significant lead
from the beginning over ocean wave energy technologies and their market grew over the
years. Their levelized capital cost also dropped because of improvement in conversion
efficiency. In recent years, wave energy converters (WECs), although still lagging far
behind solar and wind in the scale of power production, are gaining attention and renewed
confidence globally on their role to meet ever increasing demands while also complying to
stringent environmental norms. Wave power extraction, now a third generation renewable,
is rapidly maturing to compete with some of the costly energy alternatives like diesel
while establishing itself as a valuable member of many renewable portfolios. It also fits
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the distributed generation model which stresses local consumption of electricity whereby
reducing some of the inefficiencies of the T&D system. Several utility scale WEC projects
are at various stages of development in the U.S., Coastal Europe and Australia.
The objective of this paper is to propose a methodology to study wave power extraction
and analyze its potential for integration into electricity markets. A major drawback of
integrating renewable resources into the grid lies in their inherent variability. Current
literature on wave energy is unclear on what is the inherent variability of wave power and
what this variability means to integrating WECs and arrays of WECs to the grid. In this
work, we develop a preliminary model and results to close this knowledge gap. Specifically,
we demonstrate that wave power integration may in fact be economically promising based
on certain performance criteria. This article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews
the state of the art of wave energy converters and some of the underlying principles of
wave power extraction. In section 2.3, we explain the calibration and data processing
for the model. Section 2.4 describes the electrical bus network system employed for the
integration study, and analyzes the system level impacts for wave power penetration close
to 10%. A comparison to a similar deployment with wind power is also provided. Section
2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Current status of wave power generation technologies
There are different techniques proposed for on-shore, near-shore and off-shore wave
energy extraction. The process of energy generation goes through a series of steps which
includes absorption of energy from ocean waves by different types of energy capture mech-
anisms, transmission of mechanical power to the electrical generator by power take off
mechanisms, and control of the output power with suitable power electronics [32]. The
conditioning of power to make it appropriate for an electrical grid using battery storage
has also been proposed, along with systems employing arrays of WECs.
A closer look at the recent developments of wave energy technologies gives a very
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promising picture. The leading energy capture designs, based on their operating principles,
are broadly classified into Oscillating water column (OWC) type, Oscillating body and
Overtopping device. Although OWC technology was initially developed to work onshore,
the feasibility of offshore deployment is also being explored. The changing ocean water
level inside a chamber causes the trapped air above it to contract or expand thus driving
the turbine. LIMPET, with a total installed capacity of 500kW was one of the first
successful projects built on OWC technology at the Scottish Island of Islay, UK [33]. The
OCEANLINX project is another effort with a cluster of offshore OWCs operated as a
single unit by the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and is expected to
generate 91,000 terawatt-hours of electricity annually [34]. Oscillating Body, as the name
suggests, makes use of translational and/or rotational motion of a shaft as the first step
of the wave energy conversion process. The PowerBuoy by Ocean Power Technologies
(OPT), and Pelamis, by Pelamis Wave Power, are two projects based on the principle of
the oscillating body technique which have shown good prospects to move from lab scale
devices to utility scale plants. Six commercial wave farm projects of Pelamis P2 devices
are at various stages of development in Europe with installed capacities ranging from 10
to 50 MW [35]. The PowerBuoy has already been tested in Scotland, Spain and Hawaii,
and future large-scale projects are underway for Portland (Australia), Cornwall (UK),
and Coos Bay (Oregon, US) [36]. Overtopping devices are a third type of energy capture
mechanism which harness energy from the incoming waves by capturing them in a central
reservoir and releasing them back to the sea through a number of hydroelectric turbines.
The multi MW Wave Dragon projects is an example of this type developed in Denmark
and Portugal [37].
The power take off (PTO) unit is an internal system connecting the energy capture
device to the electrical generator. Based on the medium of energy transfer, it can be
broadly classified as having OWC PTO, Hydraulic PTO, or direct drive PTO mechanisms.
The air turbine in OWC operates as its PTO system while employing an active control
strategy to match the turbine speed with the air velocities driving it. The hydraulic PTO
makes use of a combination of two accumulators and a piston with check valves which
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functions as a half-wave rectifier allowing the oil to only flow in one direction, either
to the motor or turbine. It is a complicated system with many moving parts that can
cause regular wear-and-tear and oil leakage. Pelamis devices employ this kind of PTO
inside each one of the segments in their long structure. Direct drive PTOs, as the name
suggests, have a single shaft or a shaft coupled with rotating gears to generate electrical
energy through its movement in between two permanent magnets. Most of the point-
absorber-based WECs including Power Buoys and AWS, have adopted direct drive PTO
mechanisms [32]. These are active and passive control mechanisms proposed for both the
hydraulic type and direct drive PTOs.
The development of efficient power conditioning makes use of most of available tech-
nologies. Optimizing the output power from a number of wave energy converters under
a stochastic ocean environment before injecting it to the grid, generally involves more
challenging issues.
2.2.2 Variability Studies of wave
Significant wave height and average wave period contribute to wave power variability
[32]. [38] argues that there is seasonal variability of wave power and that the capacity
value of wind and wave power is comparable. On the other hand, the variability of
the wave power was compared to wind power in [39] and it was shown that there is a
significant difference in the variability of wind and wave power outputs based on the wave
data collected from different locations around the globe. The capacity value for wind
power is also reported to be lower than that for wave power in that paper. It seems
that the studies so far have conflicting rather than concrete findings regarding the relative
variability of wave and wind. [40] demonstrates that a judicious mix of different renewable
power resources (which includes wind, solar, and wave) instead of a single dominant power
source can lower the reserve requirements on the transmission network. In this kind of set-
up, net generation becomes more stable because the various variabilities tend to average
out as these variabilities are unrelated.
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2.2.3 Need for short term variability assessment
While hourly wind and wave data can effectively assess annual power production and
help one decide on site selection for wind and wave farm installation, it may prove insuffi-
cient for intra-hour operation and planning such as frequency regulation, power dispatch
scheduling, providing price signals to generator owners for bidding, and making short-
term prediction of power outputs necessary for electricity markets. These opportunities
may receive serious consideration once this renewable power is viewed as a dispatchable
generation. Active studies are being carried out to understand the effect of increased
penetration of these renewable resources in European Electricity market on a short-term,
medium-term, and long-term scales [41].
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Data Description, Wave Data
This study focuses on quantifying the short-term variability of wave power by using
high resolution measured data of ocean waves. The wave data is obtained from Belmullet
Berth B (Lat 54.23, Long -10.14), a high wave energy potential region in the northwest
coast of Ireland. The energy density in this area is estimated to be around 76kW [42].
The two months of sampled raw wave data include significant wave height and average
period reported three times every ten minutes. We pre-processed this data to eliminate
missing values and irregularities, and obtain data for every ten-minute interval compatible
with available wind data. The reason for choosing ten minutes as data resolution is
explained later.
Instead of solving for the potential wave analytically, we obtain wave power outputs
using the Pelamis P2 device with rated capacity of 750kW power matrix of the wave
energy converter [43]. The power matrix provides the average power with significant wave
height and wave period as inputs. The power matrix was originally designed to estimate
the change in power production corresponding to changes larger than 0.5 meters and 0.5
seconds in significant wave height and wave period, respectively. As this study aims to
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Figure 2.1: Interpolated power matrix
Figure 2.2: Time series of wind power (top) and wave power (bottom)
capture smaller variability of wave power, a bilinear interpolation method is employed to
extend the power matrix to such cases. Figure 2.1 shows the interpolated power matrix.
2.3.2 Data Description, Wind Data
The wind speed is obtained from the NREL-EWITS data set [44] of wind speed re-
ported in ten minute intervals. The wind data is coherent with the wave data in terms
of number of samples and time during which it is collected. The wind speeds are then
applied to power curve of a commercial wind turbine [45].
Figure 2.2 shows the output power obtained from wind and wave.
Figure 2.3 shows an example time series plot of wave height and wave power. The
wave power depends on both the mean wave height and the average wave period, with
wave height dominating the relation over time. This observation allows us to simplify the
state transitions over time, assuming that the wave period plays no role in the wave power
variability. Thus, potential wave power is approximated using only the information on
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Figure 2.3: Wave height and wave power comparison
wave height, and state transition probability matrices are calculated using this parameter
for the clustering. In future work we will use both wave height and wave frequency to
determine the clustering for the determination of the transition probability matrices.
Wind power, on the other hand, depends only on the wind speed.
2.3.3 Time Transitions of simulation inputs
The wave height and wind speed of the renewable resources are modeled using Markov
chains for the quantification of short-term variability. To characterize the variability of
wind speed and wave height, the wind speed and the wave height are partitioned into four
groups using a k-means clustering methodology [46]. The number of clusters, correspond-
ing to a number of expected states of the system, is chosen to be four for simplification of
the stochastic optimization problem discussed in Section 2.4. For the transition probabil-
ity matrix, the entire data is divided into blocks of 24 hours and each day is divided into
144 time horizons (24 hours × 6 10-minute intervals). This kind of multi-period approach
helps to capture the similarity in the nature of variability at a particular time period
every day [47]. Therefore, 144 transition probability matrices are required for every the
transitions which are then used for scheduling day-ahead power dispatch and provision
of ancillary services. The values of the available power for 10-minute intervals belong
to one of these states, namely high power availability, low power availability, and two
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intermediate scenarios.
The 144 standardized vectors of maximum power availability in each state are also
created for each one of the 10-minutes intervals in a day. Thus, two sets of the above two
inputs are created, one each for the wind and wave. This kind of model allows tractability
of the problem.
We assume nameplate capacity levels of 100 MW for both wave and wind power.
This penetration level, slightly over 10%, provides observable effects. We simulated single
wave and wind generators, as opposed to farms of devices. There is little to no study on
the variability of the power from several wave devices. Therefore, the maximum power
availability from wave generators is linearly scaled. Although there are methodologies
to estimate wind farm output from a single representative time series of wind power, we
scaled linearly the power availabilities for wind, to ensure a level playing field.
Two standard load profiles are used, one for the summer and one for the winter, to
study the effect of renewable power in the electrical grid in two different seasons. The
summer load profile has a prominent peak at the middle of the day whereas in the winter
profile, there are two peaks one occurring during the late morning hours and second one
is a large peak occurring during late evening hours There is no uncertainty in the load
profile considered in the simulation. The variability comes from the wave and wind inputs
only.
2.4 Simulation and Analysis
The results in this section assume that the market is deregulated. Figure 2.4 shows
the power network used, a highly stylized version of the PJM system, with 5-buses used
to assess the planning and operation of the electrical system under market conditions [48].
We used MATPOWER 4.1 [49] as the software tool for the simulation. The simulation
compares the difference in the response of the system when each of the two renewable re-
sources are available as part of the total generation portfolio, using a Security Constrained,
Optimal Power Flow with Endogenous Reserves [50]. Three cases are formulated as fol-
lows:
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Figure 2.4: One-line diagram of 5-Bus test network
1. Case I: Only conventional generators, base case
2. Case II: Case I + 100 MW of wave energy added at bus 4
3. Case III: Case I + 100 MW of wind energy added at bus 4
The system evaluation is made using four metrics: 1) total power generated by re-
newable resource compared to maximum capacity; 2) reserve and ramping requirements
in the day-ahead market; 3) total cost of serving the system; and 4) Load Not Served
(LNS). The base case is designed with conventional generators whose capacity sum up to
945MW. The load is 900MW in the system, all of which is dispatchable.
The Multi-period SuperOPF framework [47] is used to optimize the allocation of resources.
The results are obtained by optimizing over 144 dispatching schedules with four possible
renewable resource availability states and one contingency assumed. Following is the anal-
ysis of the simulation results:
Power generated by wind and wave
We calculate the percentage of nominal maximum power and effective power dis-
patched. The % of nominal power (Table ??, e[% W a]) refers to the percentage of actual
power dispatched to its rated capacity. This provides a rough measure of the capacity
factor of these devices. The rated capacity of both the wind and the wave farm is set
to 100MW. It is observed that both wave and wind resources deliver power for more
than 60% on average over the entire optimization horizon (1 day). Also, the availability
of wave power is somewhat lower than wind power. It is reasonable to conjecture that
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Criteria for
evaluation
Case I Case II Case
III
Summer Load Profile
1. e[% W a], e[%
W e]
N/A 64.64,
75.51
77.41,
77.78
2a. ±Av[Cp.
Res.] (MW/d)
0.45,
0.180
58.28,
1.07
87.03,
0.5951
2b. ±Av[Rp
Res.] (MW/d)
2.67,
2.55
59.28,
58.78
88.05,
87.27
3(a). E[Cost]($) 9,853 9,291 9,832
(% dev. w.r.t.
Case I)
- (5.70) (0.21)
3(b). MaxGen-
Cap (MW)
735 636 635
Winter Load Profile
1. e[% W a], e[%
W e]
N/A 64.77,
76.2
77.43,
77.71
2a. ±Av[Cap.
Res.] (MW/d)
1.24,
0.49
58.63,
0.79
87.44,
0.76
2b. ±Av[Rp
Res.] (MW/d)
2.53,
1.98
58.63,
57.88
88.54,
87.52
3(a). E[Cost]($) 10,530 9,897 10,469
(% dev. w.r.t.
Case I)
- (6.01) (00.57)
3(b). MaxGen-
Cap (MW)
780 679 680
Table 2.1: Analysis of electrical System under high penetration of renewables under
three criteria for evaluation
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the differences in average power dispatched between wind and wave generators is driven
by the power curve and power matrix used respectively to determine output power. In
both cases we use a generic power curve and power matrix. Figure 2.2 shows that the
low cut-off value of wind turbine makes it deliver power close to its rated capacity more
often. The device configuration favors wind by reducing some of its variability and al-
lowing it to operate as a bimodal resource, either at the maximum rated capacity or at
zero power. The wave energy converter, on the other hand, operates below its operating
limits most of the time translating most of the variability of the wave height into wave
power. Belmullet Berth B, where the wave data is collected, has no full scale wave energy
converters installed. Therefore, the power matrix selected in this study is not optimized
for that specific location. The expected value of effective power (Table ??, [% W e]) is
calculated to take into account the variable expected availability over the optimization
horizon. Effective power is the percentage of actual power dispatched compared to the
expected value of the maximum power available. We observe that the expected wind dis-
patches are higher than the wave dispatches. In this case, the power curve which points
to the same reason explained above. The good availability of renewable power throughout
the day clearly imply that the electricity prices at peak loads are likely to go down with
higher penetrations of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) to the grid.
Capacity and Ramp Reserves
Reserve capacity is the additional amount of power made available online by the gen-
erator units for system balance and to cover unforeseen outages (contingencies). If a
generator can adequately supply the demand promised with lesser usage of reserve ca-
pacity, the overall system cost will be less. Figure 2.5 shows that the system with wind
requires considerably more reserve capacity than the system with wave during a summer
day owing to the wind’s high short-term variability. Table ?? shows that wave power
outperforms wind in terms of the positive and negative reserve capacity, requiring almost
33 percent less positive capacity reserve than does the corresponding system with wind.
The negative capacity reserve requirements are almost negligible. The ramp reserves are
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Figure 2.5: Capacity reserves in a typical summer day
Figure 2.6: Ramp reserves in a typical summer day
necessary to allow load following in the system and cover the electricity demanded. The
system operator determines ramp reserves based on the expected load following needs
using day-ahead forecasts of generation and load. Figure 2.6 shows that Case II has com-
paratively lesser requirements for both up and down ramping than Case III. This would
also make wave power more favorable in deregulated markets as the cost of ramping has
a considerable share in the total cost of generation. The positive ramp reserve is used to
cover cases in which the power from the RES becomes unavailable. Due to the bimodal
behavior of the wind resource, the requirements are biased towards upwards reserves.
Expected generation Cost
Row 3(a) in Table ?? shows the expected cost of generation in all the three cases
under the two load types. Case I with no renewables has the highest expected cost of
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generation due to exclusive use of conventional generators. Case II has lower cost of
generation possibly due to lesser usage of reserves amongst all possible cases (including
Case III). Row 3(b) in Table ?? shows the the peak conventional generation capacity.
The two renewable cases (Cases II and III) have significant lower capacity, displaced by
either wave or wind. This simulations then support some capacity value provided by both
resources in short time scales.
Value of LNS
All system demand is modeled as dispatchable load, with the value of lost load set
to $10,000/MWh [51]. Because the system trades off the cost of providing energy and
ramping the generators to follow the load, with the penalty for load not served, the
optimization allows shedding loads in cases with low probability of occurrence, therefore
minimizing expected system cost. From the simulation, we observe that there is not much
load shedding in any of the three cases, i.e., LNS is almost always close to zero.
2.5 Conclusion
Wave energy is an abundant resource along the coastlines of the US, Europe and
Australia. The efficiency of wave energy converters is improving and their low cost of
production has scope for increased participations in the generation fleets. In this simu-
lation study, wave power integration looks economically promising with the proposed set
of evaluation criteria. Our results show that the effects of short term variability of wave
is less pronounced compared to wind which makes wave energy a promising choice for
grid operation. From the operational point of view, the variability of power from WEC is
lower, lowering the requirement for ancillary services to compensate their variability. The
expected operation costs including the procurement of ancillary services (ramp reserves)
are therefore lower, and the impact on capacity requirements for reliability purposes is
similar to those of a wind turbine. Our future work includes analysis of WEC’s arrays
compared to wind farms.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Predictive Maintenance
Policy for an Ocean Wave Farm
3.1 Introduction
Providing clean electricity from wave is a renewable energy option expected to grow and
develop in the years ahead and become a key aspect of energy portfolio. In U.S, Australia
and several western European countries, the commercialization of these technologies is
being encouraged through large scale funding programs and tax credits [52] [53] [54]. The
deployment of commercial-scale wave energy converters like “Azura”, in Kaneohe Bay, on
the islands of Oahu, Hawaii [55] and APB powerbuoy off the coast of Atlantic City, New
Jersey [36] are some examples of projects carried out in the U.S. The credit of world’s
first grid-connected wave power goes to Carnegie Wave Energy in Western Australia [56].
Offshore wind generation systems have preceded wave generation systems. While several
wind farms with capacity in the order of hundreds of MWs already operating in Europe
[57], U.S. witnessed its first offshore wind farm generating electricity commercially at
Rhode Island in the end of 2016 [58].
Compared to conventional generation and onshore renewable generation, the Levelized
Cost of Electricity (LCOE) of offshore renewable power generation systems is still high [59]-
[62]. This is in part because the technology is earlier in its development cycle than onshore
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wind or solar generation but also because these energy converters are installed offshore and
operate in harsh in-ocean conditions. For wave power to become an economically viable
second generation renewable technology, the cost components of its LCOE need to be
lowered. In this paper, we focus on strategies that minimize the maintenance costs of WEC
installations. Maintenance cost has been noted as a major share of the LCOE of offshore
renewable energy conversion and has not yet been optimally evaluated. We find that the
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs of the wave energy generation system differ from
conventional generation system. Unlike conventional generators which are typically large
stand-alone systems capable of generating substantial amounts of power with high degree
of certainty, Wave Energy Converters (WECs) are smaller and deliver small to moderate
amounts of power subject to some uncertainty. For this reason, a number of WECs are
often co-deployed within the same geographic region to exploit economies of scale and
to increase both the amount and reliability of power production. The maintenance and
replacement of any one WEC is expensive since it requires dispatching a maintenance
vessel as well as specialized equipment and manpower. Savings are possible by scheduling
joint maintenance operations for several WECs. The question then is when to schedule
joint maintenance across a farm of WECs. The intuitive answer is when the cost of
maintenance of failed or failing WECs is justifiable in relation to the status quo, i.e., the
revenue generated from producing power from functional WECs. The focus of this paper
is to quantify this intuition.
This paper is specifically concerned with the determination and analysis of an optimal
maintenance policy for wave farms. Such a policy will lower the LCOE of these farms by
minimizing the expected maintenance costs over the life of the wave farm. The formulation
studied here is a stochastic control problem where the decision is whether and when
maintenance work should be performed. It features specific modeling and optimization
challenges: 1) the modeling of correlations between random deterioration processes of
individual WECs subject to a common harsh environment; 2) the modeling of weather
which affects the deployment of maintenance ships; and 3) the curse of dimensionality
that describes the state of the wave farm as the number of WECs grows.
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We note that the structural aspects of the problem are also present in offshore wind
farm maintenance problems. Therefore, we believe our work could be adapted to offshore
wind farm maintenance. We discuss related work in offshore wind farm maintenance along
with WEC maintenance in our literature review below.
3.1.1 Contributions and Related Work
Maintenance is a key part of the asset management activities of electric utilities and
power producers. According to the survey in [63], maintenance approaches of electric
utility companies can be categorized as either (a) scheduled maintenance, where times
between maintenance operations are fixed in advance; (b) predictive maintenance, based
on monitoring the state of the equipment; and (c) emergency maintenance, when some
equipment has failed. The survey in [64] examines maintenance of offshore wind farms
with a focus on the logistics involved; each of the three maintenance approaches is well
represented. A comprehensive review of condition-based maintenance methodologies cur-
rently employed in marine renewable energy systems is provided by [65]. It states that
implementing predictive maintenance increases availability and reduces maintenance costs,
thereby improving the competitiveness of wave farms.
Several utilities have implemented Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) programs,
where the performance of several maintenance strategies are monitored and the best one
is adopted over time based on historical performance [63] [66]. For example, in [66], an
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model utilizes system health monitoring measurements to
predict the remaining useful life of each wind turbine in the onshore wind farm. This helps
to decide which turbines and exactly which components should be maintained. However,
when historical data is scarce, which is the case with offshore WECs, it makes sense for a
utility to optimize maintenance policies based on a probabilistic model, such as the model
proposed in this paper, and study the sensitivity of the policies to parameters that remain
uncertain due to the lack of experience.
In probabilistic models, the evolution of the state of a piece of equipment is represented
through a Markov or semi-Markov chain model, where transitions happen randomly to-
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wards states of higher deterioration, until repair or replacement is made. The structure of
the optimal policy for single equipment replacement problems is well known in the Markov
Decision Process (MDP) literature, and described for instance in [67], §8-2.
Transition probabilities can be estimated from historical time series relative to identical
pieces of equipment. In [68], Bayesian estimation methods are proposed and evaluated on
a steam turbine crack propagation data set. Alternatively, in [69], maximum-likelihood
methods are proposed to reverse-engineer the transition probabilities by finding those most
consistent with a maintenance policy assumed to be optimal. The approach is evaluated
on a bus engine fleet maintenance problem.
Maintenance activities for offshore wind and wave farms are similar in various ways.
In both cases, the costs of arranging maintenance crews, repair tools and transportation
to offshore locations are high. In both cases, O&M activities are influenced by weather.
Finally, in both cases, the installations will be unmanned except during maintenance [70].
Scheduled maintenance of wave energy converters are discussed in [71] and categorized
as on-site service and mid-life refit. In the former case, routine farm visits are envisioned
to occur at a chosen frequency to permit regular servicing and repair onsite. The mid-life
refit involves towing WEC units for onshore maintenance and therefore involves major
component replacement or repair. [71] estimates maintenance schedules assuming random
breakdown events with failure rates given a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
table. In such cases, given the nature of failure and availability of repair equipment and
team, the type of operation and recovery time is also adjusted. [72] [73] describe how
maintenance activities can be affected by weather and other environmental factors.
Offshore wind farm maintenance models have been explored in recent literature. In
[74], an opportunistic model is proposed that exploits low wind power production and
unexpected failures to perform preventive maintenance tasks at lower costs. In [75], a
method for assessing the reliability of potential wind farm site is presented in which wind-
speed dependent failure rates are considered. This approach takes into account the impact
of seasonable changes on wind turbine operation. In [76], the predictive maintenance of
wind turbines subject to stochastic weather events is considered. The main difference
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between this work and ours is that [76] studies the maintenance of a single wind turbine,
whereas the present paper considers the problem of maintaining the entire wave farm
based on the state of each WEC. In [77] [78] [79], optimization models for selection and/or
scheduling of maintenance activities for an offshore wind farm are presented. For example,
[77] considers decisions regarding the location of maintenance accommodation, number of
technicians, choice of transfer vessels, and use of helicopter. However, our work seems to
be the first to examine the design of optimal maintenance policy for the offshore renewable
farm as a stochastic system that is grid-connected, participates in the electricity market
and takes into account the weather conditions before taking maintenance decisions. Our
goal is to provide a maintenance strategy under these assumptions. As such our model and
results are expected to be broadly applicable. Comparisons with existing approaches are
subject to the caveat that different objective functions are being optimized. For example,
many earlier studies for renewable farms address maintenance of individual devices or
certain aspects of maintenance activities such as fleet size or scheduling, for instance [76]
[77] [80]. Other existing studies employ a data driven solution, leveraging the existence of
historical data, whereas ours is a model-based approach.
The approach proposed in this paper relies on a reduction of the state space where we
count the number of WECs in each given state. This is a technique employed for instance
in routing problems for operating a large fleet of vehicles [81]. The approach relies on the
assumption that WECs in the same state are exchangeable. This assumption is natural
if the WECs are identical, located in the same geographical area, and thereby subject to
the same sources of stress; it could be relaxed by augmenting the number of WEC states
that are distinguished and counted. The state space reduction that ensues is sometimes
referred to as “state space collapse”. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated
on a wave farm model made of N = 30 WECs. Originally the problem has 3N states, but
in the reduced state space the number of distinct states is O(N2). This makes it possible
to solve dynamic programs exactly and to perform sensitivity studies reliably.
In the wave farm maintenance problem, weather events affect the deterioration pro-
cesses as well as the ability of the maintenance vessels to be dispatched. Data driven
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models for marine weather are able to capture seasonal variabilities by utilizing the con-
cept of weather windows [61] [72]. In the literature, weather window analysis gives the
percentage of time in a year that a device can be accessed. For ease of presentation and
analysis, our work considers a system model in which the evolution of wave farm state as
well as exogenous variables such as weather are independent. The extension to a model
featuring seasonality, lending itself to weather window analysis, is possible however, for
instance using the device of p-periodic Markov Decision Processes [82].
Following nomenclature in IEEE standard [83], a simple weather model with the fol-
lowing states is adopted: Normal weather (ξN ), Adverse weather (ξA), and Major storm
disaster (ξM ). The Markov chain modeling the weather environment is assumed to be
time-homogeneous. This assumption could be relaxed by computing a time-dependent
maintenance policy over a finite horizon, or a periodic policy over an infinite horizon
using the algorithmic approach of [82]. The device of a periodic policy can be used for
instance to model a winter season during which vessels cannot be dispatched.
Finally, our work contributes to visual analytics by proposing a graphical represen-
tation of the high-dimensional state of the offshore renewable farm, that can be used
by operators to visualize probabilistic predictions and to analyze the sensitivity of the
maintenance policy to important inputs of the problem.
3.1.2 Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The main notation used in this
paper is summarized in Section 3.2. The offshore renewable farm maintenance problem is
formulated in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents numerical results and our analysis. Finally,
Section 5.5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Nomenclature
N = number of WECs in the wave farm.
i or j = index for the state of a single WEC, in {1,2,3} where 1, 2 and 3 denote healthy
state, unhealthy state and faulty state, respectively.
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t = time period index.
Ni,t = number of WECs in state i at time t.
pij = one-step marginal transition probability from state i to j for a WEC.
Wij,t+1 = number of WECs in state j at time t + 1 that originated from state i, if the
random transitions are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.)
pc = probability of common cause.
ρij = correlation coefficient between transitions from i to j for pairs of WECs.
ω1, ω2 = coefficients based on weather severity that change failure probabilities of healthy
and unhealthy WECs, respectively.
W cij,t+1 = number of WECs in state j at time t + 1 that originated from state i, if the
random transitions are correlated.
St = information state at time t.
At = decision at time t which is based on St.
Rt = expected reward (negative cost) of being in state St and selecting decision At.
Crep = expected cost of maintenance, including fixed and variable costs.
cf =fixed cost of maintenance.
c2 = unit cost per WEC of repairing N2,t WECs.
c3 = unit cost per WEC of repairing N3,t WECs.
Rgen = expected profit of operating N1,t +N2,t WECs.
1 + η = interaction coefficient among WECs influencing mean power from the wave farm.
1 + θ = interaction coefficient among WECs influencing variance of the power from the
wave farm.
σ = variance of power from a single WEC.
P1 = power from a single WEC.
pif = forward hourly price of power.
pis = random penalty hourly price of a shortfall in committed production.
φ = probability density function (pdf) of the standard Gaussian distribution.
Φ = cumulative density function (cdf) of the standard Gaussian distribution.
Bern(p) = Bernoulli distribution with parameter p.
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Figure 3.1: Ocean wave farm consisting of energy converters in 3 possible states:
(1) Healthy, (2) Unhealthy, (3) Faulty.
Bin(n, p) = binomial distribution with parameters n and p.
CB(n, p, ρ) = correlated binomial distribution with parameters n, p, ρ.
Beta(α, β) = Beta distribution with α, β as shape parameters.
γ = discount factor in (0, 1).
3.3 Mathematical Model
The ocean wave farm consists of N WECs (Figure 3.1), each of them being in one of
the following states:
• 1 : Healthy, delivers power as expected;
• 2 : Unhealthy, experiencing deteriorations;
• 3 : Faulty, severe deteriorations, no power output.
3.3.1 Wave Farm States and State Space Collapse
The number of converters in states 1,2,3 at time t are denoted N1,t, N2,t, N3,t. The
counts satisfy the relation
N1,t +N2,t +N3,t = N. (3.1)
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The state of the wave farm is described by
Nt = (N1,t, N2,t, N3,t). (3.2)
Due to (3.1) two variables suffice to determine the third one, so N2,t can be omitted in
(3.2). It can be checked that
• An integral Nt is a feasible farm state iff
0 ≤ N3,t ≤ N −N1,t ≤ N. (3.3)
• The total number of wave farm states Nt is
(N + 1)(N + 2)/2 = O(N2).
• To a wave farm state Nt corresponds a number of WEC configurations equal to
(
N
N1,t, N2,t, N3,t
)
=
N !
N1,t!N2,t!N3,t!
.
3.3.2 Weather States
The weather is modeled as a Markov chain, following standard practice in reliability
evaluation [84]. The weather state is denoted ξt. As in [83], three types of weather states
are distinguished:
• Normal weather (ξN ),
• Adverse weather (ξA),
• Major storm weather (ξM ).
Adverse weather is viewed as an alert state, potentially evolving to the major storm
types. The transition probabilities can be chosen to approximate the storm interarrival
time distribution and the weather alert system characteristics. The occurrence of severe
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cyclonic storms is often well explained by a Poisson process [85–87]. The Bernoulli process,
which is a discrete-time process with geometric interarrival times and state-independent
transition probabilities, can be used as a device to approximate the Poisson process,
which is a continuous-time process with exponential interarrival times and constant hazard
rate. Historical data are sometimes available to estimate the proportion of storms and
depressions which actually evolved into a cyclonic stage [88].
3.3.3 Decisions
Regardless of whether the repair activities are carried out onshore or offshore, dispatch-
ing a vessel is costly but a crucial step in the maintenance process. The model assumes
that if a repair vessel is dispatched, all necessary repairs will be performed on unhealthy
and faulty WECs to bring them back to the healthy state. Therefore, the decision at
time t reduces to whether or not the vessel is dispatched. It also assumes that the vessel
to carry out offshore maintenance activities is available immediately after the decision to
repair is taken. This is a reasonable assumption when the discrete time periods have a
sufficiently long duration. By the same rationale the model assumes that completing the
repair activities takes a single time step. The decision at time t is denoted At with values
• 0: Do not dispatch the vessel or do not repair,
• 1: Dispatch the vessel and repair.
The decision At depends on the wave farm state Nt and the weather state ξt. The
maintenance policy pi describes the action to take for each state. If the policy is stationary,
this can be written as
At = A
pi(St) (3.4)
where St = (Nt, ξt) is the information state and A
pi is the mapping from states to decisions.
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3.3.4 State Transitions
The wave farm state transition probabilities are computed from the WEC state tran-
sition probabilities. When the decision is to repair (At = 1), the next state is defined
as
N1,t+1 = N, N2,t+1 = 0, N3,t+1 = 0. (3.5)
The remainder of this section describes the evolution of the wave farm state without
intervention (At = 0).
The transition probabilities from state i to j for any particular WEC are described by
p12 > 0 and p23 > 0; the other probabilities pij for i 6= j are set to 0. This describes a
gradual deterioration process with state 3 as an absorbing state.
Let Wij,t+1 be the number of WECs that enter state j at time t+1 while being in state
i at time t. Since only p11, p12, p22, p23, p33 are nonzero, the wave farm state transition
under At = 0 can be described by
N1,t+1 = N1,t −W12,t+1,
N2,t+1 = N2,t +W12,t+1 −W23,t+1, (3.6)
N3,t+1 = N3,t +W23,t+1.
Models for the joint distribution of the nonnegative random vector (W12,t+1,W23,t+1) are
given in Appendix 3.6.1.
The evolution of the expectation of the wave farm state Nt under the “do not repair”
action, and normal weather throughout, is presented for a particular numerical example
in Figure 3.2. The probabilities p12 and p23 used in the simulation are 0.04 and 0.1 respec-
tively, with the WEC transitions assumed to be mutually independent (zero probability
of common cause, see Appendix 3.6.1). It can be observed that the WECs in healthy
state gradually decrease in number over time and WECs in faulty state increase in number
over time. As the number of WECs in unhealthy state changes depending on the sign of
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Figure 3.2: Expectation of ocean wave farm’s state (excluding weather state) as a
function of time under “Do not repair” action
(W12,t+1 −W23,t+1), on average, it increases initially and then steadily decreases.
Weather-Dependent Failure Probabilities: When a WEC is subjected to bad weather
conditions, its likelihood of failure may increase. Wear and tear is one cause of failure,
but other causes such as slamming [89] may be specific to extreme sea weather, leading to
our assumption of increased overall failure rate in these conditions.
This phenomenon is included in the model by making failure probabilities a function
of weather severity. As the weather deteriorates, the failure probabilities can be modified
as follows:
Pr{W12,t+1} = Pr{W12,t+1}+ ω1(1− Pr{W12,t+1})
Pr{W23,t+1} = Pr{W23,t+1}+ ω2(1− Pr{W23,t+1}) (3.7)
where ω1 and ω2 can be tuned depending on the weather condition (adverse weather or
major storm). If the weather is normal, ω1 and ω2 are zero.
Survival strategies of WECs have not been perfected yet. As suggested in [?] [?],
research on designing WEC devices that can survive extreme conditions and on the ef-
fectiveness of current life-extending controls to reduce system loading during bad weather
conditions needs to be further carried out.
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3.3.5 Rewards
The model assumes that a reward Rt = R(St, At) is obtained at each period. A reward
function R of the following form is adopted:
R(St, At) = (1−At) ·Rgen(N −N3,t)−At · Crep(Nt), (3.8)
Crep(Nt) = cf + c2N2,t + c3N3,t
= cf + c2(N −N1,t) + (c3 − c2)N3,t. (3.9)
Here Rgen is the expected profit of operating Nopt := N1,t + N2,t = N − N3,t non-faulty
converters, and Crep is the expected cost of repairing the N2,t unhealthy and N3,t faulty
converters. Healthy converters continue to operate at the time of maintenance. The
methodology to derive the overall expected profit Rgen is explained in Appendix 3.6.2.
The Crep function has a fixed cost component cf for sending the vessel, and a variable
cost component where c2 ≤ c3 are the expected cost of repair per converter in unhealthy
and faulty states, respectively. Note that the repair cost coefficients c2,c3 are costs per
single WEC being repaired.
Weather-Dependent Reward Function
In the weather-dependent model, the reward function is also a function of the weather
state. Specifically, both the revenue component and maintenance cost component of the
reward function are different under different weather conditions. The cost of maintenance
increases with deterioration in weather conditions as
Crep(Nt, ξ
N ) < Crep(Nt, ξ
A) < Crep(Nt, ξ
M ). (3.10)
With the worsening of weather conditions, the height of the ocean waves increases to
dangerous levels more frequently. It is expected that the WEC production efficiency
reduces due to protection systems that operate more frequently during adverse ξA and
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major adverse ξM weather. This leads to lower expected revenues from generation. Thus,
Rgen(N −N3,t, ξN ) > Rgen(N −N3,t, ξA) >
Rgen(N −N3,t, ξM ). (3.11)
Remark 1: Given St = (Nt, ξt), let Z(St) be the set of states Z = (Y, ξt) such that the
wave farm state Y = (Y1, Y2, Y3) is reachable from Nt under the “passive” policy At′ = 0
for all t′ = t, t+ 1, . . . . Then it holds that
R(Z, 0) ≤ R(St, 0) for all Z ∈ Z(St),
R(Z, 1) ≤ R(St, 1) for all Z ∈ Z(St).
To see this, note that when the system evolves without repair, it evolves towards states
where, relative to the current state, the repair costs can never decrease and the generating
instantaneous reward can never increase.
Remark 2: Along state trajectories generated with At′ = 0 for t
′ ≤ t− 1, it holds that
for both actions a ∈ {0, 1},
R(St+1, a) ≤ R(St, a). (3.12)
To see this, note that the set of feasible wave farm states can be described as
{(N −N1, N3) : N1 ≥ 0, N3 ≥ 0, N1 +N3 ≤ N}.
Regardless of weather, the set of feasible next states while being in state (N1, N3) and
choosing action At = 0 can be described by
S′(N −N1, N3) =
{(N −N ′1, N ′3) : 0 ≤ N ′1 ≤ N1, N3 ≤ N ′3 ≤ N −N1}.
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In the case At = 0,
R(St+1, 0) = R
gen(N −N ′3) ≤ Rgen(N −N3) = R(St, 0),
using Rgen nondecreasing and N ′3 ≥ N3.
In the case At = 1,
R(St+1, 1) = −Crep(Nt+1)
= −(cf + c2(N −N ′1) + (c3 − c2)N ′3)
≤ −(cf + c2(N −N1) + (c3 − c2)N3)
= −Crep(Nt) = R(St, 1),
using N ′1 ≤ N1, N ′3 ≥ N3, and 0 ≤ c2 ≤ c3.
Remark 3: Along state trajectories generated with At′ = 0 for t
′ ≤ t− 1, it holds that
the function ∆R(St) := R(St, 1)−R(St, 0) satisfies
∆R(St+1) ≥ ∆R(St). (3.13)
To see this, note that we have
∆R(St) = −Crep(Nt)−Rgen(N −N3,t).
Along transitions with At = 0, it holds that R
gen(N − N3,t) = R(St, 0) is nonincreasing,
and −Crep(Nt) = R(St, 1) is nondecreasing.
3.3.6 Objective Function
Using the states, decisions, transition and reward function described above, the prob-
lem is formulated as the search for a policy that maximizes the expected discounted
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cumulated reward over an infinite horizon:
V (S0) = max
pi∈Π
Epi
[ ∞∑
t=0
R(St, A
pi(St))
∣∣∣ S0] , (3.14)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and Π denotes the space of stationary Markov
decision policies. The optimal value function V ∗ satisfies
V ∗(S) = max
A∈{0,1}
[
R(S,A) + γ
∑
S′
Pr(S′|S,A)V ∗(S′)
]
. (3.15)
The optimal policy pi∗ can be computed using standard dynamic programming algorithms
such as value iteration or policy iteration [90].
3.4 Results and Analysis
In this section, we present the solution of the infinite horizon problem defined in
(3.14). At first, we define the baseline case and then consider different cases to compare
and contrast the optimal policies. First, the results on the structure of the optimal policy
under different cases are discussed. Then, other results of the optimization problem that
include the steady-state transition probabilities and trajectory of the wave farm states
under optimal policy are presented. In our simulation, we have defined the parameters for
a typical ocean wave farm to generate the results. The numerical values of the parameters
used are based on communication from wave farm energy industry experts and believed
to be practically possible. We make the numerical analysis of the following cases.
Baseline: The number of wave energy converters in the wave farm is taken as N = 30.
The probability pc that explains the dependencies among random transitions of the wave
farm states is set to zero. η is set to zero which means that no interaction among WECs
is assumed. Refer to Appendix 3.6.2 for the detailed description of pc and η. The fixed
cost of dispatching maintenance vessel and crew cf is set to 500. The weather is assumed
to remain in normal state throughout. The parameters used to define the reward function
in the system model are defined in Table 3.1. The parameters for the sensitivity analysis
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c2 10 P1 0.4
c3 15 V1 0.04
pif 30 η −0.3
pis 100 θ −0.5
Table 3.1: Parameters in Reward Function
p12 p23 pc cf η
Baseline 0.01 0.3 0 500 0
Case I.A 0.001 0.3 0 500 0
Case I.B 0.01 0.01 0 500 0
Case II.A 0.01 0.3 0.5 500 0
Case II.B 0.01 0.3 0.9 500 0
Case III.A 0.01 0.3 0 70 0
Case III.B 0.01 0.3 0 4000 0
Case IV.A 0.01 0.3 0 500 0.2
Case IV.B 0.01 0.3 0 500 −0.8
Case V 0.01 0.3 0 500 0
Table 3.2: Parameters for Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Policy Under Baseline and
Five Cases.
of the optimal policy under baseline and five cases described next are tabulated in Table
3.2.
Cases:
I. Sensitivity of the optimal policy to failure probabilities
II. Sensitivity of the optimal policy to common cause indicator pc
III. Sensitivity of the optimal policy to fixed cost of maintenance cf
IV. Sensitivity of the optimal policy to interaction coefficient η
V. Effect of different weather conditions: The state transitions of the Markovian weather
are shown on Table 3.3. The cost of repair of each WEC in adverse and major storm
weather is set as c2,ξA = 5c2, c3,ξA = 10c2 and c2,ξM = 10c2, c3,ξM = 30c3, respec-
tively with c2, c3 as in Table 3.1.
We solve (3.14) using the linear programming approach to dynamic programming.
While any linear optimization or conic optimization solver can be used for this purpose,
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ξNt+1 ξ
A
t+1 ξ
M
t+1
ξNt 0.995 0.0049 0.0001
ξAt 0.5 0.0001 0.4999
ξMt 0.5 0.5 0
Table 3.3: Transition Probabilities of a 3-state Markov Model of Weather [1]
(a) Baseline (b) Case I.A (c) Case I.B
(d) Case II.A (e) Case II.B (f) Case III.A
(g) Case III.B (h) Case IV.A (i) Case IV.B
(j) Case V. in Normal weather (k) Case V. in Adverse weather (l) Case V. in Major storm
weather
Figure 3.3: Optimal Policy for the studied cases(Filled circle: Repair. White circle: Do
not repair)
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(a) Baseline with starting state for the policy
simulation is {N1 = 30, N2 = 0, N3 = 0}
(b) Baseline with starting state for the pol-
icy simulation is {N1 = 5, N2 = 8, N3 = 17}
(c) Case with p12 = 0.3 and starting state
{N1 = 30, N2 = 0, N3 = 0} for which “do
not repair” at any state is the optimal policy
Figure 3.4: Steady-state probabilities in greyscale (darker means higher probability
value). The trajectory of expected wave farm state under optimal policy is indicated by
a continuous curve that starts from an initial state marked with the asterisk (*).
V ∗(Adaptive) J∗(Scheduled) T ∗s a
Baseline 208060 77922 14
Case I.A 228840 77922 14
Case I.B 221110 188220 41
Case II.A 182450 −1573 50
Case II.B 166130 −8636 50
Case III.A 227410 114040 10
Case III.B 142490 −31324 50
Case IV.A 373640 148620 10
Case IV.B 82019 27640 23
aFor each value of J∗, T ∗s is the corresponding optimal
inter-maintenance time
Table 3.4: Comparison of Objective Values under Different Maintenance Strategies
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we use the solver Sedumi [91], called from Matlab. The optimal policies for the above
cases are illustrated in Figure 3.3. In these plots, the X-axis represents the number of
WECs that are not in healthy state (N − N1 = N2 + N3) and the Y-axis represents the
number of WECs that are in faulty state (N3) in the wave farm. All the possible states of
the wave farm are represented as small circles. The state on the origin is the wave farm
state with all healthy WECs (N −N1 = 0, N3 = 0).
In all the plots of optimal policy, one can identify a curve that separates the decision
region “Do not repair” (represented with white circles) and the decision region “Repair”
(represented with filled circles). In the sequel, this curve is being referred to as the
threshold line.
Case I: In Figure 3.3(b), the shifting of threshold line in the optimal policy depends
on the change of the probability of a WEC transitioning from healthy to unhealthy state
and from unhealthy to faulty state. When the failure probability p12 is increased, the
threshold shifts upwards compared to the baseline threshold line, indicating it is better
to wait until a larger number of WECs turn faulty. This would avoid frequent repairs
which are expensive. On the other hand, when p12 is decreased, the threshold line shifts
downwards. This indicates that the incentive to do frequent repair is higher as the WECs
can be expected to stay in healthy state for longer durations of time. A similar behavior
is observed regarding the shifting of the threshold line by varying failure probability p23
as shown in Figure 3.3(c). The decrease of p23 leads to WECs staying in unhealthy state
for longer durations of time to generate power. Therefore, it is economical to wait for
more WECs to turn faulty before selecting the repair action. Figure 3.3(c) reflects this
phenomenon.
Case II: In Figure 3.3(d) and 3.3(e), the effect of having a common cause influencing
failure probabilities of a WEC on the threshold line is presented. We employ joint failure
model 2 given by (3.20) and (3.21) in Appendix 3.6.1 to illustrate this. Upon increasing
the value of pc, it can be observed that the threshold line shifts to the right indicating
that a common cause might cause the WECs to turn faulty faster. This is because q12,1
and q23,1 are respectively higher than q12,0 and q23,0. Therefore, the failure correlation
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coefficient should also be assessed to determine the best maintenance strategy.
Case III: In Figure 3.3(f) and 3.3(g), we study how the fixed maintenance cost cf
impacts the optimal policy. Decreasing or increasing cf leads to an optimal policy whose
threshold line shifts to the left or right compared to the baseline threshold line, respectively.
For example, the overall maintenance cost owing to high fixed maintenance cost at a wave
farm state lying on the baseline threshold line would be higher than the accumulated
revenue of generating power from operating WECs under no repair.
Case IV: In Figure 3.3(h) and 3.3(i), the sensitivity of the optimal policy to the inter-
action coefficient of a WEC is illustrated. As the interaction coefficient directly influences
the revenue from each WEC, the threshold line also shifts with the interaction coefficient.
When the interaction coefficient is greater than one, there is constructive interference of
the waves created by the WECs resulting in higher expected reward. This provides the
incentive to go for maintenance more often as the revenue from power generation is ex-
pected to be high. When the interaction coefficient is less than one, there is destructive
interference of the waves resulting in lower expected reward. As a result, the threshold
line moves upwards, meaning that the repair of the wave farm when a greater number of
WECs are in the deteriorated state is more economical.
Case V: To study the impact of weather on the wave farm maintenance strategy, the
weather state is introduced as an exogenous variable in the overall system state. The
wave farm state transition function and reward function are defined under three different
types of weather state. The solution of the dynamic program gives an optimal policy
corresponding to each weather type as illustrated in Figure 3.3(j), 3.3(k) and 3.3(l). We
can observe that during major storm (ξM ) conditions, one cannot repair. This is consistent
with the typical perception and industry practice. It is best to carry out repair action in
normal weather as the cost of dispatching maintenance vessel as well as failure probabilities
are small. In adverse weather condition, the repair is to be done only if many WECs have
fallen into faulty state as the cost of maintenance is higher than under normal weather
condition.
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3.4.1 Steady-state probabilities and Policy Simulation
The steady-state probabilities are defined by q∞ = q∞Qpi where Qpi is the transition
probability matrix under policy pi and q∞ satisfies
∑
j q∞,j = 1. Under the optimal policy
pi∗, the elements Qpi∗ik are given by Pr(St = k|St−1 = i, Api∗t−1(i)). The policy simulation
is executed by picking an initial probability q0 concentrated on the starting state and
calculating the trajectory of next states using state probabilities qt = q0(Q
pi)t until the
end of truncated time horizon. The values of q∞ for each state and the expected state
evolution under the optimal policy pi∗ are illustrated in Figure 3.4. The steady-state
probability is represented in levels of gray varying from black at the highest probability
to white at the lowest probability. From the figure, one can get information on the
most likely wave farm states in steady-state under the optimal maintenance policy. In
the baseline case, it can be observed that the wave farm is likely to have predominantly
healthy WECs. In Figure 3.4(c), an extreme case is considered in which the probabilities
of failure, p12 = 0.9 and p23 = 0.9, are reasonably high. In such cases, it is economical
not to perform repair as healthy WECs quickly turn into unhealthy and eventually faulty
states. The non-zero steady-state probabilities of the wave farm are concentrated on the
vertex (N1 = 0, N2 = 0, N3 = 30) where the system state consists of faulty WECs only.
In Figure 3.4, policy simulation results are illustrated as the continuous line trajectory
with starting state marked by asterisk (∗). Figure 3.4(a) shows that when the starting
state is at the origin (all the WECs are in healthy state), after several time steps, the
wave farm state settles around a medium-size region where the steady-state probabilities
of the wave farm states are high. In Figure 3.4(b), the starting wave farm state is taken
as {N1 = 5, N2 = 8, N3 = 13}. The immediate optimal action at that particular state
is to “repair”. As a result, the wave farm is renewed to all healthy WECs and then the
state evolves as in the previous case. The optimal policy is simulated for extreme case in
Figure 3.4(c) with starting state {N1 = 30, N2 = 0, N3 = 0}. We can observe that after a
few time steps, the system deteriorates to the state with all faulty WECs.
76
3.4.2 Comparison with Scheduled Maintenance Policy
Scheduled maintenance is also a commonly suggested strategy for ocean wave farm.
Scheduled maintenance is carried out by dispatching a maintenance vessel at fixed time
intervals to repair or replace the WECs that are not operating well. In the proposed
system model, we refer to those WECs as unhealthy and faulty WECs. Let Ts be the time
interval between two consecutive maintenance activities.
We make a comparison between the expected cumulative discounted reward from the
scheduled maintenance policy that employs the best possible inter-maintenance parameter
Ts, and the optimal adaptive policy pi
∗ studied in this paper. We consider the case where
the weather remains in normal state throughout. Under “do not repair” action, the wave
farm state evolves according to the failure probabilities of individual WECs until Ts − 1
time steps. The “repair” action at time step Ts restores the wave farm to a state with all
healthy WECs. Let the transition matrix under no repair be denoted by Q. The elements
of Q are determined by (3.21) in Appendix 3.6.1. The probability of being in each state
at time t is described as the row vector pt = p0Q
t where p0 is the row vector of initial
probabilities. Assuming that p0 = [1 0 . . . 0] to start from full healthy state, the expected
discounted return during the first Ts periods is
J1(Ts) =
Ts−2∑
t=0
γt[
∑
S
[pt(S)R(S,A = 0)]]
+γTs−1[
∑
S
[pTs−1(S)R(S,A = 1)]]
Thus, the total expected return and corresponding best time interval for scheduled main-
tenance is given by
J∗ = max
Ts∈{2,...,Tf}
J1(Ts)/(1− γTs)
and T ∗s = argmax
Ts
J1(Ts)/(1− γTs), respectively. Tf is the maximum time interval being
considered for the scheduled maintenance. The value of Tf can be set to be much higher
than the average time it takes for the probability that all the WECs in faulty state to be
close to 1. In our simulations, Tf is set to 50. Table 3.4 reports the values of J
∗ for the
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baseline case and cases I-IV. The table also reports the corresponding optimal value of Ts.
The values of J∗ are compared to the values V ∗ obtained with the optimal state-based
maintenance policy. We can clearly see that the proposed maintenance policy outperforms
the scheduled maintenance policy in all four cases. We can also notice that in a few cases,
carrying out scheduled maintenance may even result in negative expected return. In such
situation, no value of Ts less than Tf can be selected before all the WECs in the wave
farm turn into faulty states.
3.5 Conclusion
In this work, we propose an adaptive maintenance strategy for a group of WECs.
Today’s WECs are characterized by low output power and high failure probability which
are incorporated in the system model of the wave farm to be maintained. The optimal
policies under different system parameters are analyzed. Results from solving maintenance
optimization problem for wave farms may help farm owners to schedule maintenance
activities efficiently for different farm sizes. Instead of going for arbitrary maintenance of
individual devices, repairing a group of devices all at once can substantially lower the cost
of dispatching maintenance vessel fleets.
Although the numerical studies have been carried out with N = 30 WECs, the pro-
posed approach could accommodate much larger fleets, since the number of states in our
formulation only grows quadratically with N rather than exponentially. The proposed
maintenance strategy is also general enough to be applicable not just to the maintenance
of wave farms but also to offshore wind farms and other arrays of devices that are expensive
to reach, such as offshore weather monitoring sensors. This can be done by appropriately
defining the reward and transition probabilities of the deterioration states in those systems.
In future work, one could consider the case where the wave farm state is only partially
observable and an inspection is required from time to time to know the exact number of
WECs in different states. There have been several studies on maintenance decision under
uncertainty. However, a maintenance and inspection strategy for a group of devices in
the context of wave energy production has not been explored yet. Future work would also
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investigate the structure of the optimal policy under partial observability.
3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Joint Failure Models
If the random transitions at the level of each WEC are statistically independent,
W12,t+1 and W23,t+1 are easily found to follow binomial distributions:
W12,t+1 ∼ Bin(N1,t, p12),
W23,t+1 ∼ Bin(N2,t, p23).
It is more realistic to assume, however, that the random transitions are not independent,
for instance to model deteriorations due to common causes. There are several ways to
achieve this:
1. WEC deteriorations are assumed to be pairwise correlated. Wij,t+1 given Ni,t is
decomposed as a sum of dependent Bernoulli random variables,
Wij,t+1 =
Ni,t∑
k=1
W kij,t+1, (3.16)
where E[W kij,t+1] = pij , var[W kij,t+1] = pij(1 − pij), and covar[W kij,t+1,W `ij,t+1] =
ρijpij(1− pij). Here ρij is the correlation coefficient, assumed to be nonnegative. In
this case, Wij,t+1 given Ni,t follows a correlated binomial distribution [92]:
Wij,t+1 ∼ CB(Ni,t, pij , ρij), (3.17)
79
which is statistically equivalent to
W ′ij,t+1 = (1− Z)W1 + Z(Ni,tW2),
Z ∼ Bern(ρij),
W1 ∼ Bin(Ni,t, pij),
W2 ∼ Bern(pij), (3.18)
that is, a mixture distribution between a binomial and a rescaled Bernoulli with
values in {0, Ni,t}. The probability mass function (pmf) of Wij,t+1 is
P[Wij,t+1 = w] = (1− ρij)
(
Ni,t
w
)
pwij(1− pij)Ni,t−w
+

ρij(1− pij) if w = 0,
0 if w = 1, . . . , Ni,t − 1,
ρijpij if w = Ni,t.
(3.19)
Thus, higher values of ρij lead to greater probabilities of the extreme outcomes w = 0
and w = Ni,t.
2. Let Z0,t+1 ∼ Bern(pc) be a common cause indicator, and let Wij,t+1 be i.i.d. condi-
tionally to Z0,t+1, with Wij,t+1|(Z0,t+1 = 0) ∼ Bern(qij,0) and Wij,t+1|(Z0,t+1 = 1) ∼
Bern(qij,1). By marginalizing out Z0,t+1, Wij,t+1 becomes a mixture of binomials:
P[Wij,t+1 = w] = pc
(
Ni,t
w
)
qwij,1(1− qij,1)Ni,t−w
+ (1− pc)
(
Ni,t
w
)
qwij,0(1− qij,0)Ni,t−w. (3.20)
The common cause indicator can be shared among W12,t+1 and W23,t+1, leading to
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a joint distribution
P[W12,t+1 = w12,W23,t+1 = w23]
= pc[
(
N1,t
w12
)
qw1212,1(1− q12,1)N1,t−w12 ]
· [
(
N2,t
w23
)
qw2323,1(1− q23,1)N2,t−w23 ]
+ (1− pc)[
(
N1,t
w12
)
qw1212,0(1− q12,0)N1,t−w12 ]
· [
(
N2,t
w23
)
qw2323,0(1− q23,0)N2,t−w23 ]. (3.21)
3. The probability pij is assumed to be drawn from a Beta distribution at each tran-
sition: pij,t ∼ Beta(αij , βij). Then Wij,t|pij,t ∼ Bin(Ni,t, pij,t). That is to say, Wij,t
follows a Beta-binomial distribution, the pmf of which is given by
P[Wij,t+1 = w] =
(
Ni,t
w
)
B(w + αij , Ni,t − k + βij)
B(αij , βij)
,
where B(α, β) is the beta function.
Methods to estimate αij , βij from data are described in [93], since the Beta-binomial
is a particular case of the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution.
3.6.2 Derivation of Expected Profit
The Rgen function can be estimated by fitting a power output model to data from lab
or at-sea experiments on arrays of converters, and taking into account dispatchability and
electricity market considerations, as we now describe.
For instance, suppose that from reported lab experiments, the average output of a
single WEC is P1, and the average output of an array of N converters is
PN := (1 + η)NP1,
where (1+η) is an interaction coefficient. If the interactions are positive (η > 0), the output
is superlinear in N , as documented in [94]. If the interactions are negative (−1 < η < 0),
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the output is sublinear in N , as documented in [95]. Given the points (0, 0), (1, P1),
(N,PN ), a quadratic power output model can be fitted to estimate the average power
output P as a function of x = Nopt :
P (x) = P1(1− ηN−1)x+ P1 ηN−1x2.
In our system model, Nopt = N1,t +N2,t. The output model could of course be refined by
conducting lab experiments with different array sizes.
Suppose it is optimal for the wave farm to bid a certain quantile of its predicted power
distribution, in order to maximize its expected profit, as described for instance in [96] and
also justified below. As documented in [97], arrays of converters decrease the standard
deviation of the aggregated power. Therefore, an increase in x = Nopt should also help to
increase the optimal offer and expected profit.
For instance, suppose the variance of the power output of a single WEC is σ21, and the
variance of the power output from the array is
σ2N = (1 + θ)Nσ
2
1,
where θ < 0 as documented in [97]. Given the points (0, 0), (1, σ21), (N, σ
2
N ), a quadratic
model can be fitted to estimate the variance V as a function of x = Nopt :
V (x) = σ21(1− θN−1)x+ σ21 θN−1x2.
In the absence of other information on the distribution of the power output, we adopt
the maximum entropy distribution for a nonnegative random variable with given mean
P (x) and variance V (x). This is known to correspond to a truncated Gaussian distribution
on R+. The mean and standard deviation (µx, σx) of the Gaussian to be truncated can
82
be obtained by solving numerically for (µ, σ) the nonlinear system of equations
µ+ σ φ(µ/σ)Φ(µ/σ) = P (x)
σ2
[
1− (µ/σ) φ(µ/σ)Φ(µ/σ) −
(
φ(µ/σ)
Φ(µ/σ)
)2]
= V (x)
 (3.22)
which expresses the mean and variance of a truncated Gaussian supported on [0,+∞) (see
e.g. [98]). The quantile function (inverse cdf) at level p of the truncated Gaussian is then
given by
F−1
µx,σ2x
(p) = µx − σxΦ−1((1− p)Φ(µx/σx)).
For the type of two-stage settlement markets studied in [96], the expected hourly profit
is then obtained as the optimal value to a newsvendor-type problem (see e.g. [96]),
Rgen(x) = max
q≥0
{pifq − Ep|x[pis(q − p)+]},
where pif is a known forward hourly price of power, pis is the random penalty hourly price
of a shortfall in committed production, p¯is = E[pis], and power spillage has been assumed
to have no penalty. It is optimal to offer a newsvendor-type quantity
Cx = F
−1
µx,σ2x
(pif/p¯is),
to get (see e.g. [96])
Rgen(x) = pifCx − p¯is
∫ Cx
0
(Cx − p)fµx,σ2x(p)dp.
Lengthy but straightforward calculations lead to the following particular result for the
truncated Gaussian density fµx,σ2x :
Rgen(x) = pifµx + p¯i
sσx
φ(µx/σx)− φ(Cx−µxσx )
Φ(µx/σx)
, (3.23)
where (µx, σx) solves (3.22).
83
Chapter 4
Optimal Control Strategy of
Battery participating in Frequency
Regulation Market
4.1 Introduction
In this work, we devise control strategies for GSS systems participating in wholesale FR
markets. In particular, control rules are devised by inspecting optimal control solutions
that trade off battery health factors such as energy throughput vs. market factors such
as the performance score and revenues.
The AGC signals are generated on short time scales (seconds) which implies that
accurately following it would lead to high energy exchange rate for the GSS. Such operation
clearly affects battery life. Thus, the questions this work answers are twofold. First, what
is the trade-off between battery degradation factors and market participation and can it
result in improved revenue over the battery life? If so, what control strategy or rules
would enable these benefits?
In papers [99] [100] [101], the issues of degradation of batteries participating in FR
have been discussed. Papers [99] and [100] focus on evaluating battery degradation and
do not provide practical control strategies for market participation. These articles provide
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good depth on the battery health aspects but make several assumptions such as a zero-
mean AGC signal (which may not always be the case). In addition, they do not analyze
the tradeoffs between degradation and market revenues making it challenging to devise
control strategies with a desired tradeoff. In [101], authors propose a control strategy
of intentionally deviating from the regulation signal to achieve higher long term profits
though they do not guarantee any performance through optimization. Moreover, the
proposed strategy does not account for daily differences in AGC signal and the multitude
of battery degradation factors.
The main contribution of our work is to evaluate the optimal trade-off between the
GSS performance and degradation factors and devise control rules based on this evaluation.
Several control strategies are compared based on the weights assigned to the performance
and degradation factors. Co-optimizing revenue and degradation brings more control over
GSS degradation factors. We show that the market price as an input and past perfor-
mance as a feedback to the GSS controller provides control over revenues and guarantees
an improved performance. Simple rules for the response signal are devised from the re-
sults of the optimization problem and their impact in terms of revenue performance and
degradation factors is shown to be better than existing strategies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II details the problem
formulation that includes a brief overview of a typical GSS performance evaluation process,
types of degradation models and the optimal control formulations. Section III presents
the results obtained and discusses their impact.
4.2 Optimal Battery Control Strategy acknowledging Con-
tinuous Degradation
4.2.1 Performance Factor
PJM interconnection evaluates the performance of a resource in FR markets by com-
puting an hourly performance factor pfh which is defined as weighted sum of following
three scores. [102].
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Figure 4.1: GSS in electricity network
• Correlation score = max(δ=0 to 5Min) σSignal,Response(δ, δ + 5Min) calculated every
10s. Here σ is correlation function and δ is shifted time steps.
• Delay score = δ − 5Min
5Min
calculated every 10s
• Precision score = 1-Abs
[∑
Abs(Pt)−
∑
Abs(AGCt)∑
Abs(AGCt)
]
where AGCt and Pt are AGC
and response signal respectively.
4.2.2 Revenue
Resources once qualified to participate in the PJM FR market submit bids for power
quantity and price (both capacity and mileage). The day-ahead market is cleared for every
hour and hourly market prices αh are set. In real-time, each market cleared resource is
paid an amount adjusted by a performance factor evaluated by SO. Roughly, the hourly
payment to a resource i can be described as
ri,h = αh × pf i,h (4.1)
Market regulations has set minimum acceptable performance score below which the par-
ticipating resource shall be disqualified. The past hourly performance values also impact
its future bid selection process. In this regard, SO uses the past performance scores and
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computes their average in a rolling horizon fashion. This moving average is termed as
historical performance score (pfhsh )
4.2.3 Dynamic Programming (DP) Framework
Under the assumption that daily AGC signal, AGCt, is known in advance, a GSS
operator with battery capacity C maximizes total reward over the time horizon T , i.e.
max
Pt
T∑
t
R(Pt, St) (4.2)
where St is the system state and Pt is the action or response signal. The GSS reward
function, Rt at each time step t is a weighted sum of instantaneous revenue (rt) and
degradation factor (dt) written as
R = λrt + (1− λ)dt, λ ∈ (0, 1) (4.3)
The state of charge SoCt constrained between 0 to 1 defines the physical dynamics of the
GSS. Using the above market mechanisms and making following assumptions, we define
baseline model(Type 0) and three proposed revenue models(Type I,II,III) to be used in
the DP formulation.
• The time horizon, T is chosen as 24 hours.
• A unified time step t for all system variables are chosen as 10s. AGC signal is
interpolated accordingly.
• The hourly performance score pfh is simplified as only the precision score obtained
every 10s defined as
pf t = 1−Abs[AGCt − Pt], t ∈ (10, 20, . . . , T = 86400) (4.4)
where AGCt is interpolated to time step t. Note that the area under the response
signal in 10s is energy in/out of GSS (otherwise defined as instantaneous energy-
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throughput, CtPt ) The correlation and delay scores are removed to maintain causal-
ity of revenue variables (from GSS perspective, calculating correlation involves the
prediction of its own action to decide current action). In addition, calculating corre-
lation of two signals is computationally expensive and does not provide new insights
in market participation.
• Similar to pfhsh defined by PJM as an average of past 100 steps pfh, our historical
performance definition pfhst is a moving-average of fewer past pf t.
• The dynamic market prices are uniform (same) within an hour.
Degradation Factors
Two types of instantaneous degradation factors (or degradation functions), dt similar
to [103] are defined below:
• Instantaneous normalized energy throughput: |E|2t
• Instantaneous SoC deviation level: | SoCt − SoCref
SoCmax − SoCref |
Like performance factor, the value of a degradation factor is normalized from 0 to 1. The
instantaneous degradation cost is defined as kdt where k is a constant that denotes the
cost of replacement, maintenance etc incurred due to degradation scaled down to dollar
per 10s. The accumulated degradation cost over battery life time signifies lost revenue
due to low operating life.
System Models
To incorporate different market elements such as pf t, αh, pf
hs
t , four types of system
models are defined. For each type of revenue models, the system state St and objective
Rt are defined as follows.
• Type 0: St = (SoCt, AGCt), Rt = pf t
• Type I: St = (SoCt, AGCt), Rt = λpf t + (1− λ)dt
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• Type II: St = (SoCt, AGCt, αh), Rt = λCαhpf t + (1− λ)kdt
• Type III: St = (SoCt, AGCt, αh, pfhst ), Rt = λ(Cαhpf t + f(pfhst , αh)) + (1− λ)kdt
Type 0 is the baseline revenue model in which high performance score can be ensured
just by following the AGC signal without violating SoC constraint at all time instant. In
type I formulation, only the performance factor pf t is sought to be maximized and the
reward function trades off pf t vs. the degradation factor dt. In type II formulation, price
is added as a state variable and is considered in the reward function and the revenues are
traded off against dt. In type III, historical performance factor pf
hs
t is incorporated in the
reward function and f(.) denotes a penalty function for low pfhst . In all the above cases
dt is based only on the energy throughput unless SoC based degradation is specifically
specified.
In the optimal problem formulation, SoC is discretized into 1000 values, response
signal into 22 values and historical performance factor into 50 values. The DP problem
formulation is based on the Bellman equation and is solved backward in time for different
values of λ to obtain the optimal states and actions.
4.3 Results and Analysis
Results from solving optimization of finite horizon net reward(eq. 4.2) under different
problem formulations are presented. In particular, the revenue-degradation trade-off is
analyzed using optimal performance factor pf∗t and optimal degradation factor d∗t and
subjective assessment of the optimal action signal, P ∗t (or response) is discussed. A hy-
pothesis of control rules based on Type I problem result is described and tested using a
simulation case study. Type I problem is discussed in detail because its results can be
compared to current industry practices(similar to Type 0).
Type II and III problem results and the subsequent control strategies are extensions
of the Type I results. They substantiate our argument that there are key market factors’
information can help optimize net revenue for the GSS. Finally, results on trade-off and
corresponding response signal are obtained using degradation as a function instantaneous
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(a) Type I: instantaneous performance-
degradation factor (energy throughput) trade-off
(b) Response signal for 3 hours from type I prob-
lem formulation
SoC level as types I-III focus only on energy throughput based degradation.
Type I Problem: In Figure 4.2(a), we observe that the trade-off is more pronounced
in region II compared to region I suggesting reduction of average degradation(dav =∑T
t=0 d
∗
t /T ) by lowering average performance factor(pfav =
∑T
t=0 pf
∗
t /T ) can be eco-
nomically beneficial in long run. However, this trade-off is not as attractive if the current
average performance factor is already quite high (region I).
This characteristic of the trade-off is attributed to the fact that the instantaneous
energy in and out decreases with more weight,λ, on the degradation compared to revenues.
Therefore, the response corresponding to increasing weights on degradation give increasing
value of total energy throughput for the same AGC signal in a day. More importantly,
the optimal response signal exhibits a cut-off value beyond which AGC signal need not
be followed as shown in Figure 4.2(b). Based on these observations, we conjecture that
the cut-off value or threshold of the response signal is a function of average instantaneous
degradation and devise the following control rules
1. To reduce the value of average degradation factor to ”x∈ [0, 1]”, the response signal
should follow AGC signal till
|AGCt| ≤ k1 −
√
k2 − k3x
2(k4 − k1 +
√
k2 − k3x)
(4.5)
where k1, k2, k3 and k4 are constants obtained from curve fitting the degradation
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factor as a function of the relative weight. The degradation depends on the AGC
signal on that particular day. Therefore, we can expect similar values of constants
under similar AGCs obtained on different days.
2. This rule should be followed as long as the performance factor is high enough to not
run the risk of facing disqualification in the market which is discussed in Type III
later.
Type II Problem: The trade-off curve shown in Figure 4.2 is obtained using a
periodic bi-level(High-Low) hourly market price structure. As the revenue is a function of
market price along with performance score, the trade-off curve is influenced by it. When
the market prices are low, the optimal solution aggressively reduces instantaneous cost of
degradation dav. Another observation is that the optimal response signal has a cut-off
Figure 4.2: Trade-off plot obtained from type II problem formulation
limit which varies linearly in this problem set-up(not shown due to space limitation) with
market price and desired hourly cost of degradation. It is understood that when the hourly
market price is high, the AGC signal should be followed as closely as possible and when
market price is low, the threshold is lower. This threshold can be determined through
a similar curve fitting exercise as the one in the discussion of the type I problem above.
Figure 4.3 shows the existence of threshold(that also shifts with λ) in optimal response
signal under low hourly market price.
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Figure 4.3: Optimal response signal trajectory under type II problem formulation
Type III Problem The results of type III show that control strategies can be de-
veloped specifically to prevent the performance score from dropping continuously in Type
II problem when market prices are low. The historical performance score is added to the
state information to facilitate this. The optimal results are compared against type II prob-
lem results under an hourly market price sequence {Pr} = 20, 80, 40, 60 (i.e. not Type II
bi-level prices). As illustrated in figure 4.4, the performance factor stays above 0.7 even
in the low market price hour and under reasonable weight to degradation cost in a four
hour horizon. The optimal response signal as shown in figure 4.5 tracks the AGC closer
during the low price period compared to its counterpart from type II problem solution
and achieves close to the same overall reduction in the cost of battery degradation.
Figure 4.4: Performance score in four hours corresponding to each hourly market price under
type III problem formulation
Results from these simple problem formulations show that a rule on response signal can
be developed based on the values of historical performance score, SoC and market prices.
The results from using an SoC based degradation factor in the type I problem formu-
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Figure 4.5: Optimal response signal in four hours under type III problem formulation
Figure 4.6: Trade-off plot under type I problem formulation that has SoC based degradation
factor
lation includes the trade off curve shown in figure 4.6. The SoC and response signal are
shown in figure 4.7. Trade-off curve shows that performance factor is not very sensitive to
a large range of values of weight on instant degradation cost. This is due to the fact that
the SoC transitions are not very drastic in a particular time interval so as to influence
the instantaneous energy throughput significantly. However, the SoC level is increasingly
tightened around the reference SoC level as more weight is given to instantaneous degra-
dation cost. A reference SoC of 0.5 is chosen in this problem. This hints at control rules
based on the acceptable SoC window similar to the AGC threshold discussed in the above
cases.
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Figure 4.7: SoC level and response signal trajectories obtained from type I problem formulation
that has SoC based degradation factor
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Chapter 5
GPS Timing Synchronization
Attack: Characterization and
Detection in Smart Grid Networks
5.1 Introduction
A modern wide area monitoring system supporting the future grid will include a vastly
improved information and communications functionality that allow service providers to
sense, monitor, and manage electricity flows throughout the grid [104]. While the cyber-
physical integration improves the performance and efficiency of the grid, it increases the
vulnerability of the grid to potential cyber-attacks. Security of the power grid has received
significant attention in the literature [105] - [110]. In this paper, we address the problem
of cybersecurity in smart grid networks involving PMUs taking into account the dynamical
nature of the power system.
A PMU can record synchrophasors at a high sampling rate, and the measurements
are synchronized to an absolute time reference provided by the GPS. It is possible to
deceive the GPS receiver by transmitting spurious signals resembling the normal GPS
signals, leading to timing synchronization errors and this referred to as a GPS-spoofing
attack [111]. In an electric grid with PMUs, GPS spoofing results in counterfeit time
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stamps to the true phasors and is referred to as the timing synchronization attack (TSA)
[112]. Since a TSA only alters the time stamps without inducing changes in the actual
measurements, it results in confusing the command center with erroneous system operation
status. Evaluating the threat to PMUs and the countermeasures to combat TSA is a topic
that has received considerable attention in the literature [113] - [123].
We analyze the implications of TSAs on the dynamical behavior of the power system.
The dynamical model of the power system [124] is considered, and it is assumed that
PMUs are installed on all the generator buses. We show how TSAs, characterized using
a scalar parameter, alter the phasor readings by transforming the system matrix in the
measurement equation of the model. In our analysis, the time of attack and the scalar
parameter which results in the TSA are assumed unknown. For this setup, we develop
a generalized likelihood ratio-based hypotheses testing procedure to detect changes from
the normal operating behavior when the system is subjected to a TSA. Monte Carlo
simulations using a 9-bus, 3-machine test system are performed to demonstrate (a) the
implication of a TSA on the dynamic state estimation (DSE) and (b) the performance
of the proposed test. Asymptotic performance results of the test which are applicable to
practical (large) smart grid networks are also presented. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time a characterization of the impact of a TSA on the dynamic behavior of
power system and its detection is reported in the literature. These studies are important
for efficient wide area monitoring and to initiate timely action in the event of a security
threat to the grid. The initial results of this work appeared in [125].
In Section 5.2, we present the dynamical model of the power system and characterize
the TSA. The hypothesis test to detect the spoofing attack is presented in Section 5.3.
Simulation results are in Section 5.4. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.5.
Asymptotic analysis is relegated to the appendix.
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5.2 System Model
5.2.1 Dynamic Model of the Power System
The power system comprising generators, electrical loads and the transmission network
is modeled using differential and algebraic equations. At the ith generator, the rotor angle
(δi), the rotor speed (ωi) and the internal voltage (Ei) of the synchronous generator are the
state variables of the system governed by differential equations, while the nodal voltage
magnitudes (Vi) and the phasor angles (θi) are the algebraic variables. To analyze the
system’s behavior we consider the 3rd-order differential equations, which can sufficiently
capture the dynamics of state variables [126].
We consider an n-bus, m-generator system where the state vector of the linearized
model for synchronous generator is denoted by xi = [∆δi ∆ωi ∆Ei]
′, i = 1, . . . ,m and [·]′
denotes the transpose of the vector. The state xi captures the change of the i
th generator’s
variables around an operating point, which depends on the network topology, generator
parameters and the load. In the absence of a control mechanism, a perturbation caused
by a change in these components can alter the system stability. We model the evolution
of the 3m× 1 state vector xt = (x1,x2, . . . ,xi, . . . ,xm) by
xt = Axt−1 + vt, (5.1)
where A is the 3m × 3m (for the 3rd-order model) state transition matrix. The modes
given by the eigenvalues of A are assumed to be sufficiently damped for the system to
be stable. In other words, a stable open loop system is considered so a zero control
input can be employed for simplification. The entries of A are given by the following
sub-matrices each of size m × m: A11 = 0 (zero matrix), A12 = I (identity matrix),
A13 = 0, A21 = ga(δo, Eo, θo, Vo, YL), A22 = −diag(Di), A23 = gb(δo, Eo, θo, Vo, YL),
A31 = gc(δo, Eo, θo, Vo, YL), A32 = 0, A33 = gd(δo, Eo, θo, Vo, YL), where Di is the damping
of the ith generator, YL is the load admittance, and (δo, Eo, θo, Vo, YL) is the operating
point around which the system is linearized to make it viable for small signal analysis.
The functions ga(·), gb(·), gc(·) and gd(·) can be written in matrix form [127] and are
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not presented here for the sake of brevity. The 3m × 1 state transition noise vector vt is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) and Gaussian with 3m× 1
zero mean vector and 3m× 3m covariance matrix Cv,t.
The ithPMU records the voltage magnitude Vi and the phasor angles θi, while the
rotor speed ωi is typically measured using a separate sensor and is incorporated into the
measurement equation. The 3m× 1 measurement vector at time t is the deviation of the
measurements from steady state measurement values denoted by yti , [∆Vri,∆ωi,∆Vj i]
where Vri = Vi cos(θi), Vj i = Vi sin(θi) and is given by
y˜t = Sxt +wt, (5.2)
where wt is the 3m × 1 measurement noise vector assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian with
3m× 1 zero mean vector and 3m× 3m covariance matrix Cw,t. The measurement matrix
is given by
S =

S11 0 S12
0 I 0
S21 0 S22
 , (5.3)
Here, S is 3m × 3m square block matrix of 9 entries with each entry being a matrix of
size m×m given by
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S11 = (−Yf rdiag1:m(Eoisin(δoi))
−Yf jdiag1:m(Eoicos(δoi))), (5.4)
S12 = (Yf rdiag1:m(cos(δoi))
−Yf jdiag1:m(cos(δoi))), (5.5)
S21 = (Yf rdiag1:m(Eoicos(δoi))
−Yf jdiag1:m(Eoisin(δoi))), (5.6)
S22 = (Yf rdiag1:m(sin(δoi))
+Yf jdiag1:m(cos(δoi))), (5.7)
where diag1:m(ui) denotes a square diagonal matrix of size m having ui at diagonal entry
i. Yf r and Yf j are the real and imaginary parts of (YG + YL + Ybus)
−1YG where YG and
YN are the generator and bus admittance matrices [127].
5.2.2 Characterization of TSA
In this subsection, we show how a TSA alters the measurement matrix S in (5.2).
The voltage represented in complex phasor form at generator i is given by V˜i = Vri +
jVj i, where Vri and Vj i denote the real and imaginary components, respectively. A time
synchronization attack on a PMU at node i, denoted by the time-shift βi(tc), modifies the
instantaneous nodal voltage signal by introducing a phase change as follows:
V˜i(t+ βi(tc)) = Vi(t+ βi(tc))×
cos [2pifc(t+ βi(tc)) + θi(t+ βi(tc))] , (5.8)
where tc denotes the time instant of the spoofing attack. Assuming normal steady
state operation before attack (SSOBA), so that the unattacked version of (5.8) is a
sinusoid (constant Vi and θi over time), the synchronization delay attack changes the
model by adding a factor 2pifcβi(tc) to the phase at time tc, where fc denotes the op-
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erating frequency of the system. The voltage phasor after a TSA can be written as
V˜i = Vi∠(θi + 2pifcβi(tc)) = V¯ri + jV¯ji, where ∠(·) denotes the phase. We thus have
V¯ri = Vi cos(θi + 2pifcβi(tc))
= Vi cos(θi) cos(2pifcβi(tc))
−Vi sin(θi) sin(2pifcβi(tc))
=Vri cos(2pifcβi(tc))− Vj i sin(2pifcβi(tc)), (5.9)
V¯ji = Vi sin(θi + 2pifcβi(tc))
= Vi sin(θi) cos(2pifcβi(tc))
+Vi cos(θi) sin(2pifcβi(tc))
=Vji cos(2pifcβi(tc)) + Vri sin(2pifcβi(tc)), (5.10)
which can be compactly written as follows:
 V¯ri
V¯ji
=
cos(2pifcβi(tc)) − sin(2pifcβi(tc)
sin(2pifcβi(tc)) cos(2pifcβi(tc))

 Vri
Vji
. (5.11)
However, SSOBA results in
∆V¯ri
∆V¯ji
=
cos(2pifcβi(tc)) − sin(2pifcβi(tc)
sin(2pifcβi(tc)) cos(2pifcβi(tc))

∆Vri
∆Vji
 . (5.12)
Using [∆Vr ∆Vj ]
′ = [∆Vr1, . . . ,∆Vrm,∆Vj1, . . . ,∆Vjm]′
 ∆Vr
∆Vj
 =
 S11 S13
S31 S33

 ∆δ
∆E
 , (5.13)
we can write  ∆V¯r
∆V¯j
 =
 M1 −M2
M2 M1

 S11 S13
S31 S33

 ∆δ
∆E
 , (5.14)
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where M1 = diag1:m(cos(2pifcβi(tc))) and M2 = diag1:m(sin(2pifcβi(tc)). The new mea-
surement equation after a TSA is given by
yt = MSxt + vt, (5.15)
where
M =

M1 0 −M2
0 I 0
M2 0 M1
 . (5.16)
In effect, the GPS spoofing attack under SSOBA can be modeled as modification of the
observation matrix based on the attack parameters βi(tc). Using the measurements yt,
the goal of this paper is detect changes in the observation matrix due to a TSA in the
given power network.
5.3 Detection of TSA
The theory of hypothesis testing has been well developed in the statistics litera-
ture [128], while being further refined for many practical applications by the signal process-
ing community [129]. Given fully known statistical models for a set of sensor observations
under two different possible circumstances which are called hypotheses H0 and H1, the
theory will allow one to make optimum decisions on which hypothesis is true. The opti-
mality criterion is related to the probability that one makes the wrong decisions. In this
paper, the observations are made by some PMUs (augmented by some other sensors), and
H0 represents the hypothesis that the no PMU is subjected to a GPS spoofing attack,
while H1 represents the hypothesis that some PMU was subjected to an attack.
For the observation model in (5.15), let p(y|Hj), j = 0, 1, denote the probability density
function (PDF) of the observations evaluated when Hj is true. This is proportional to the
probability that the observations are in an infinitesimally small region around the actual
observations y when Hj is true. We can compute the probability that the observations y
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lie in some set by integrating the appropriate PDF (under H0 or H1) over all y in that
set. Let Pr(Hj) denote the probability of Hj being true; note that, Pr(H0) = 1−Pr(H1).
There are two types of errors the test can make, and thus two types of probabilities of
error: the probability the test picks H1 when H0 is true, or the probability the test picks
H0 when H1 is true. Let Γ be the the set of all y for which the test will decide H1. Thus
for any y /∈ Γ the test will decide for H0. The total (average) probability of error is
pe
(a)
= Pr(H0)
∫
x∈Γ
p(y|H0)dy + Pr(H1)
∫
y/∈Γ
p(y|H1)dy
= Pr(H0)
∫
y∈Γ
p(y|H0)dy
+Pr(H1)
(
1−
∫
y∈Γ
p(y|H1)dy
)
= Pr(H1) +∫
y∈Γ
(Pr(H0)p(y|H0)− Pr(H1)p(y|H1)) dy, (5.17)
where the first term in (a) is Pr(H0) times the probability the test makes an error by
deciding for H1 when H0 is true, denoted as Pr(decide H1|H0) and called the probability
of false alarm (Pf ). The second term in (a) is Pr(H1) times the probability the test
makes an error by deciding for H0 when H1 is true, denoted as Pr(decide H0|H1) =
1− Pr(decideH1|H1). Pr(decide H1|H1) is called the probability of detection (Pd).
In order to make pe as small as possible, we include y in Γ if these y make Pr(H0)p(y|H0) <
Pr(H1)p(y|H1) since including these y in Γ will make pe smaller from the last line of
(5.17). For any y such that Pr(H0)p(y|H0) > Pr(H1)p(y|H1), these y must be kept out
of Γ since they will make pe larger if they are included. Note that any y that provide
Pr(H0)p(y|H0) = Pr(H1)p(y|H1) can be either put into or left out of Γ, and they will have
no impact on pe. This optimum test is called the likelihood ratio test, which compares
the ratio of p(y|H1) to p(y|H0) to the threshold τ = Pr(H0)/Pr(H1). If Pr(H0) = Pr(H1)
then the likelihood ratio test chooses H1 if the probability that the observations are in
an infinitesimally small region around the measured value of y when H1 is true is larger
than the probability that the observations are in an infinitesimally small region around
the measured y when H0 is true. Now if we have prior knowledge that H0 or H1 are more
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likely, then this should bias our decision, which is what the likelihood ratio tells us to do
from the threshold τ = Pr(H0)/Pr(H1). In fact there is a trade off between the two types
of errors Pr(decide H1|H0) or Pr(decide H0|H1) set by the threshold. Thus if we make
τ < 0 then we can make Pr(decide H0|H1) = 0 since we always decide for H1 but we
also make Pr(decide H1|H0) = 1. If we set τ = ∞ then we never decide for H1 and so
Pr(decide H1|H0) = 0 but Pr(decide H0|H1) = 1. In general we can prove that making τ
larger always makes Pr(decide H1|H0) smaller and Pr(decide H0|H1) larger.
In our problem, p(y|H1) contains some unknown parameters (say, θ), and so we denote
this as p(y|θ,H1). In such cases, it is common to employ the generalized likelihood ratio
test (GLRT) which replaces the likelihood ratio with
max
θ
p(y|θ,H1)
p(y|H0) . (5.18)
The interpretation is that we employ an estimate of the unknown parameter θ which
maximizes the likelihood function of the observation. If the estimate of θ is very accurate,
then the GLRT is close to the optimum test (i.e. the likelihood ratio test). In our problem,
the performance loss of GLRT compared to the likelihood ratio test is not very large and
the loss tends to decrease as we employ more high quality data.
We now present a test to detect changes in the measurement matrix in the event of a
TSA. Let us suppose that a TSA has been initiated at the time instant tc, leading to an
alteration of the measurement matrix S. We denote the resulting measurement matrix by
Sc ,MS (see (5.15)). Given the set yT , {y0, . . . ,yT−1} of measurements, the problem
is formulated as one of devising a statistical testing procedure to detect the change - owing
to an attack - in the measurement matrix as reliably as possible. More precisely, we need
to devise a test to distinguish between the following two hypotheses:

H0 : y
T in (5.2),S = S0, t = 0, . . . , T − 1
H1 : y
T in (5.2),S =

= S0, t = 0, . . . , tc − 1
= Sc 6= S0, t = tc, . . . , T − 1.
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The hypotheses test involves comparing a test statistic to a threshold and is of the
form Λ
[
H0]H1≷ρ where Λ is the test statistic and ρ is the test threshold. We adopt the
Neyman-Pearson criterion to set ρ for a given false alarm probability [129]. The likelihood
ratio test statistic is given by
Λ =
p(yT |yT−1;Sc)× · · · × p(ytc+1|ytc ;Sc)
p(yT |yT−1)× · · · × p(ytc+1|ytc)
. (5.19)
The conditional probability p(yt|yt−1;Sc) under hypothesisH1 is given by, for t = tc, . . . , T−
1,
p(yt|yt−1;Sc) =
exp
{−12(yt − µ1t)′Σ−11t (yt − µ1t)}
(2pi)K/2|Σ1t|1/2
,
where µ1t , E[yt|yt−1] = ScAS−1c yt−1 is the mean vector and Σ1t , Cov[yt|yt−1] =
ScAS
−1
c Cw,t−1(ScAS−1c )′ + ScCv,tS′c +Cw,t is the covariance matrix. For the likelihood
function under H0, µ1t and Σ1t will be replaced by µ0t and Σ0t, respectively, while the
matrix Sc will be replaced by S0. In our problem setup, the measurement matrix Sc after
a TSA and the time instant tc when the spoofing attack is launched on the PMUs are
unknown, and will have to be estimated; therefore, GLRT (5.18) is employed. From (5.15)
and (5.16), we see that estimating the matrix Sc is equivalent to estimating the parameter
β, which results in GPS spoofing. The GLRT statistic is given by
max
tc
max
β
[p(yT |yT−1;Sc)× · · · × p(ytc+1|ytc ;Sc)]
p(yT |yT−1)× · · · × p(ytc+1|ytc)
. (5.20)
The maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of β and tc are obtained as follows. We consider
a discrete set Tc of time instants at which TSA can be launched. For every tc ∈ Tc, the
value of β that maximizes the likelihood function [p(yT |yT−1;Sc)× · · · × p(ytc+1|ytc ;Sc)]
is the ML estimate of β, and is denoted by βˆ. The value of tc that maximizes the function
maxβ [p(yT |yT−1;Sc)× · · · × p(ytc+1|ytc ;Sc)] is the ML estimate of tc and is denoted by
tˆc.
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Taking logarithms on both sides of (5.20), the test becomes
ln Λ = Λ′
[
H0]H1≷ ln ρ = ρ′, (5.21)
Λ′ =
T−1∑
t=tˆc
(yt − µ0t)′Σ−10t (yt − µ0t)
−(yt − µ1t)′Σ−11t (yt − µ1t), (5.22)
ρ′ =
T−1∑
t=tˆc
2ρ− ln
{ |Σ0t|
|Σ1t|
}
, (5.23)
µ0t = S0AS
−1
0 yt−1, (5.24)
µ1t = SˆcASˆ
−1
c yt−1, (5.25)
Σ0t = S0AS
−1
0 Cw,t−1
(
S0AS
−1
0
)′
+S0Cv,tS
′
0 +Cw,t, (5.26)
Σ1t = SˆcASˆ
−1
c Cw,t−1
(
SˆcASˆ
−1
c
)′
+SˆcCv,tSˆ
′
c +Cw,t (5.27)
Under hypothesis H0, (yt − µ0t)′Σ−10t (yt − µ0t) is central Chi squared, while (yt −
µ1t)
′Σ−11t (yt−µ1t) is the generalized Chi squared each with 3m degrees of freedom (d.o.f.).
For t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we thus see that the under H0, the test statistic Λ in (5.19) is
the difference between the central Chi squared and the generalized Chi squared random
variables each with 3m × (T − tc) d.o.f. whose PDF is difficult to establish in closed-
from [130]. We, therefore, resort to numerical evaluation to analyze the performance of
the test in Section 5.4.
For sake of comparison, we also present one ad hoc test that has been employed in
similar problems. This test is sometimes called the residual test. The residual is given
by rt = yt − yˆt|t−1, where yˆt|t−1 is the predicted measurement vector computed by a
Kalman filter. The residual test compares ||rt||2 to a threshold chosen to fix the false
alarm probability.
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Figure 5.1: A 3 Machine, 9 bus test system (known as P.M Anderson 9 Bus).
5.4 Simulation Results
We conduct experiments on the 9−bus 3−machine Western System Coordinating
Council (WSCC) test case with the state space model specified in [126] to demonstrate
the effect of a TSA and to verify the performance of the hypotheses test in (5.21). A
block diagram of the test bus system is shown in Fig. 5.1. A PMU is assumed to be
located at each of the generator nodes. Although TSAs can be launched on several PMUs
simultaneously, in this paper we give detailed discussion for the case of a single PMU (on
node i = 1) being compromised. The results are based on L = 5× 104 Monte Carlo (MC)
simulations. First we linearize our system model around an operating point as described
in [127]. Let S0 denote the output matrix of this linearized state space model. In the
linearized state space model, we choose the covariance matrices Cw,t (corresponding to
noise vector in input-output equation) and Cv,t (corresponding to the noise vector in state
update equation) to be σ2I with σ = 0.01. The dynamic state estimation (DSE) proce-
dure is implemented by employing the discrete-time Kalman Filter (KF) for t = 0.1 to
10s at a sampling rate of 100 samples/s.
At the time instant t = 5s, we launch a TSA by setting the attack parameter at
node 1 equal to 8.33ms and the attack parameter for all other nodes equal to 0, i.e.,
βi(tc) = b1 = 1/2fc = 8.33ms for i = 1 and βi(tc) = 0 for i 6= 1, where fc = 60Hz is
the grid frequency and βi denotes the attack parameter at the i
th node which alters the
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Figure 5.2: RMSE of the rotor angle ∆δ1 when the TSA is induced at tc = 5s.
β1(tc) = b1 or b2 where b1 = 8.33ms and b2 = 0.833ms.
measurement matrix of the model. After the attack, the KF continues to update the state
estimate on receiving a new observation yt according to xˆt|t = xˆt|t−1 + Kt(yt − S0xˆt|t−1)
when the output matrix has changed from S0 to Sc = MS0, where M is given in (5.16).
The performance of the filtering algorithm is assessed by plotting the root mean squared
error (RMSE) of the estimated state variable as a function of time. The RMSE for the
rotor angle ∆δi at time t is given by
RMSE∆δi,t =
√√√√ 1
L
L∑
`=1
(
∆ˆδ
`
i,t −∆δ`i,t
)2
, (5.28)
where ∆ˆδ
`
i,t and ∆δ
`
i,t denote the estimate and the true value, respectively, of the rotor
angle at time t in the `th MC simulation. The RMSE for the internal voltage ∆Ei of the
ith generator is defined analogously. In Fig 2, we plot the RMSE of the rotor angle of
the synchronous generator at node 1 as a function of time for normal operating conditions
and when a TSA is launched on the bus system. It can be seen that, due to TSA at
t = 5s there is a sudden increase in the RMSE; such a drastic performance change is not
observed under normal operating conditions. A similar behavior is observed in the plot
of the RMSE of the internal voltage of the generator at node 1 as shown in Fig 3. Such
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Figure 5.3: RMSE of the internal voltage ∆E1 of the generator 1 when the TSA is
induced at tc = 5s. β1(tc) : b1 = 8.33ms or b2 = 0.833ms.
Figure 5.4: The ROCs of the proposed test compared to that of LRT for different values
of the attack parameter.
drastic degradation in the performance is hazardous, since erroneous state estimates can
result in wrong control signals issued by the command center. When β1(tC) = b1 the
change in performance is easily recognizable. However, when the magnitude of the TSA
is small, say β1(tc) = b2 = 0.1b1, the change is not recognizable as shown in Fig. 5.2 and
Fig. 5.3. Our proposed hypotheses test can efficiently detect whether the system is under
attack even for small magnitudes of TSA.
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To analyze the performance of the proposed detection scheme, we plot the receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) of the test in (5.21) which is the most well accepted
measure [129]. For the false alarm probability Pf ∈ (0, 1], the detection probability Pd is
computed using L Monte Carlo instantiations. The ROCs are plotted for different attack
parameters: β1(tc) = b3 = 0.133ms, β1(tc) = b4 = 0.186ms, β1(tc) = b5 = 0.239ms, and
β1(tc) = b6 = 0.292ms. As shown in Fig. 5.4 the detection performance improves with
increased magnitudes of the attack parameter. In the literature, it is discussed that attack
parameters smaller than 0.013ms are insignificant since they do not affect normal system
operations. Thus, TSAs caused by β1(tc) < 0.013ms need not be detected. We also
compare the ROC of the proposed test with the clairvoyant likelihood ratio test (LRT), in
which β1(tc) is assumed to be known and gives an upper bound on the performance of the
proposed test. As shown in Fig. 5.4, the performance of the proposed test is comparable
to that of LRT.
In the next experiment, we show the effect of window size (i.e. the time span over
which the system is observed) on the performance of the test. Increased window size
provides more data samples, which enables a better characterization of the TSA and also
reduces the effect of noise. However, it also increases the delay in making the decision,
since the hypotheses test can be performed only after collecting all the samples in the
specified timeframe. In Fig. 5.5, we plot of ROCs of the proposed test and that of LRT
for different window sizes. It can be seen that for 60 samples, the performance of the
test is quite reasonable even for a small value for β. This result is important from the
standpoint of practical implementation, since the test can provides a reasonably good
performance even with a smaller number of samples and for short time windows. For
the attack parameter of 0.278ms, the results in Fig. 5.5 indicate significant improvement
in performance for increasing time windows, suggesting a tradeoff between the desired
performance and tolerable delay.
Next, we demonstrate the performance degradation of the test when the time of attack
tc is unknown. The ROCs of the proposed test and LRT are obtained for β = 0.236ms and
window sizes 100 and 200. As shown in Fig. 5.6, the performance of the test expectedly
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Figure 5.5: The ROCs of the proposed test and that of LRT for different window sizes:
N1 = 100, N2 = 80, N3 = 60, N4 = 40.
degrades when tc is unknown (hence, estimated). The degradation in performance is
mainly due to the error incurred in estimating tc. However, the performance degradation
is negligible for larger window sizes.
We also compare the performance of the proposed test with the standard residual test,
which is an ad-hoc test that has been frequently employed in the power systems literature.
For a given false alarm rate, the probability of detection can be easily computed using
known procedures. We plot the ratio of detection probabilities of the residual test and
the proposed test for different sample sizes. As shown in Fig. 5.7, the proposed test
consistently outperforms the residual test for small magnitudes of the TSA. This shows
considerable improvement in performance of detection of the TSA using the proposed test
over an ad-hoc test.
5.5 Concluding remarks
A natural extension of this work is to analyze the performance of our test when multiple
PMUs are attacked leading to a larger separation between the two distributions p(y|H0)
and p(y|H1). This suggests an improved performance of the proposed test when more
than one PMU in the network is subject to a TSA. Simulation results confirmed that
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Figure 5.6: The ROCs of the proposed test for unknown time of attack. The ROC of the
clairvoyant LRT is also plotted.
Figure 5.7: The ratio of Probability of detection obtained from residual test and GLRT
test versus number of observations used in the tests
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when multiple PMUs in the grid were attacked, the ROC of proposed test was more
favorable than the ROC when a single PMU was subject to a TSA. In the interest of
space, we do not include those results in this paper. We have reported the results of our
proposed test for a small bus system (see Fig. 5.1) as an aid to present the main part of the
paper clearly. However, the number of nodes in a wide-area smart grid network is quiet
large, and with the initiative of power utilities to populate the grid with a greater number
of PMUs, it is important to extend the analysis of this work to large scale networks. From
an engineering viewpoint, the characterization of the performance of the test for a very
large number m of buses demands attention. In the appendix, we derive the asymptotic
(large m) expressions for the threshold and probability of detection Pd which can be used
to analyze the performance of the test in these practical (large) scenarios.
For real world power networks spread over a wide geographical area, i.e., when the
number of buses in the grid is very large (m → ∞), we can efficiently approximate the
test statistic to derive its asymptotic PDF under both hypotheses H0 and H1. Using these
asymptotic PDFs, computable expressions for the test threshold ρ′ and the probability
of detection Pd are derived. These expressions are not applicable to the WSCC test case
(since m is very small) considered in this paper. Note that, the test statistic is the same
as given in (5.21).
.0.1 Asymptotic (m→∞) PDF of the test statistic under H0
We denote z0t,H0 = (yt−µ0t)′Σ−10t (yt−µ0t) and z1t,H0 = (yt−µˆ1t)′Σ−11t (yt−µˆ1t) when
yt is sampled from the distribution corresponding to the null hypothesis H0. It is seen that
(yt − µ0t) is Gaussian distributed with the 3m× 1 mean vector γ0t,H0 = EH0 [yt − µ0t] =
S0AS
−1
0 yt−1 − S0AS−10 yt−1 = 0 and the 3m × 3m positive definite covariance matrix
Ω0t,H0 = EH0 [(yt − µ0t)(yt − µ0t)′]. Further, (yt − µˆ1t) is Gaussian distributed with the
3m×1 mean vector γ1t,H0 = EH0 [yt − µˆ1t] = S0AS−10 yt−1−SˆcASˆ−1c yt−1 and the 3m×3m
positive definite covariance matrix Ω1t,H0 = EH0 [(yt − µˆ1t − γ1t,H0)(yt − µˆ1t − γ1t,H0)′].
Thus, both z0t,H0 and z1t,H0 follow the generalized Chi square distribution [131]. It
has been shown that the generalized Chi square distribution can be approximated as
112
the noncentral Chi square distribution χ23m(λ) with 3m degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) and
noncentrality parameter λ [132]. In our problem setup, z0t,H0 ∼ χ23m(λ0t,H0) with λ0t,H0 =
1
2γ
′
0t,H0
Σ−10t γ0t,H0 = 0, and z1t|H0 ∼ χ23m(λ1t,H0) with λ1t,H0 = 12γ ′1t,H0Σ−11t γ1t,H0 . Under
hypothesis H0, the test statistic Λ is, therefore, the difference between a central Chi square
RV with 3m(T − tˆc) d.o.f. and a noncentral Chi square RV with 3m(T − tˆc) d.o.f. and
noncentrality parameter
∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ1t,H0 . Since the distribution of the difference between a
central Chi square RV and a noncentral Chi square RV is very difficult to characterize and
does not permit a closed-form expression [130, Chapter 4A], we resort to approximation.
The analysis is especially applicable for wide-area smart grid networks, i.e., for large m
the following approximations hold:
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z0t,H0 ∼ χ23m(T−tˆc) ≈ N
(
3m(T − tˆc), 6m(T − tˆc)
)
,
(.29)
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z1t,H0 ∼ χ23m(T−tˆc)
T−1∑
t=tˆc
λ1t,H0
 , (.30)
which can be approximated as follows:
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z1t,H0 ≈ ϕ0B0, where B0 ∼ χ2ν0 , (.31)
ϕ0 ,
3m(T − tˆc) + 2
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ1t,H0
)
3m(T − tˆc) +
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ1t,H0
) , (.32)
ν0 ,
[
3m(T − tˆc) +
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ1t,H0
)]2
3m(T − tˆc) + 2
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ1t,H0
) , (.33)
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z1t,H0∼Γ
(ν0
2
, 2ϕ0
)
≈ N (ν0ϕ0, 2ν0ϕ20), (.34)
where Γ
(
ν0
2 , 2ϕ0
)
denotes the Gamma distribution with parameters ν02 and 2ϕ0. Therefore,
113
we have
Λ|H0 ∼ N (µΛ|H0 , σ2Λ|H0 − 2κH0), (.35)
where
µΛ|H0 = 3m(T − tˆc)− ν0ϕ0, (.36)
σ2Λ|H0 = 6m(T − tˆc) + 2ν0ϕ20, (.37)
κH0 = cov
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z0t,H0 ,
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z1t,H0
 . (.38)
The covariance κH0 under hypothesis H0 is computed as follows: we first generate L
samples from two normal distributions N (3m(T − tˆc), 6m(T − tˆc)) and N (ν0ϕ0, 2ν0ϕ20),
where ϕ0 and ν0 are given by (.32) and (.33), respectively. The covariance κH0 is given by
κH0 =
1
L− 1
L∑
`=1
[
z`H0 − 3m(T − tˆc)
] [
x`H0 − ν0ϕ0
]
, (.39)
where, z`H0 denotes the realization of the RV
∑T−1
t=tˆc
zt,H0 at the `
th instantiation; similarly
for x`H0 . We let Λ
std|H0 = Λ|H0−µΛ|H0√
σ2
Λ|H0−2κH0
∼ N (0, 1). For a fixed false alarm rate Pf = α,
according to the Neyman-Pearson criterion [129],
∫ ∞
ρ′
p(Λstd|H0)dy = Q
 ρ′ − µΛ|H0√
σ2Λ|H0 − 2κH0
 = α
⇒ ρ′ =
√
σ2Λ|H0 − 2κH0Q
−1(α) + µΛ|H0 , (.40)
where Q(·) denotes the Q−function [129]. The covariance κH0 can be calculated using
computer simulations.
.0.2 Asymptotic (m→∞) PDF of the test statistic under H1
We denote z0t,H1 = (yt−µ0t)′Σ−10t (yt−µ0t) and z1t,H1 = (yt−µˆ1t)′Σ−11t (yt−µˆ1t) when
yt is sampled from the distribution corresponding to the hypothesis H1. For t = tˆc, . . . , T−
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1, we see that (yt − µ0t) is Gaussian distributed with the 3m × 1 mean vector γ0t,H1 =
SˆcASˆ
−1
c yt−1−S0AS−10 yt−1 and the 3m×3m positive definite covariance matrix Ω0t,H1 =
EH1 [(yt − µ0t − γ0t,H1)(yt − µ0t − γ0t,H1)′]. Similarly, (yt − µˆ1t) is Gaussian distributed
with the 3m × 1 mean vector γ1t,H1 = EH1 [yt − µˆ1t] = SˆcASˆ−1c yt−1 − SˆcASˆ−1c yt−1 = 0
and the 3m× 3m positive definite covariance matrix Ω1t,H1 = EH1 [(yt − µˆ1t)(yt − µˆ1t)′].
Thus, for t = tˆc, . . . , T − 1, z0t,H1 ∼ χ23m(λ0t,H1) with λ0t,H1 = 12γ ′0t,H1Σ−10t γ0t,H1 ,
and z1t,H1 ∼ χ23m(λ1t,H1) distributed with λ1t,H1 = 12γ ′1t,H1Σ−11t γ1t,H1 = 0. Therefore,
under H1, Λ is the difference between a noncentral Chi square RV with 3m(T − tˆc) d.o.f.
and noncentrality parameter
∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ0t,H1 and a central Chi square RV with 3m(T − tˆc)
d.o.f. whose distributions are difficult to characterize and does not permit closed-form
expressions [130, Chapter 4A]. For large m, we use the following approximations:
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z1t,H1∼χ23m(T−tˆc) ≈ N
(
3m(T − tˆc), 6m(T − tˆc)
)
(.41)
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z0t,H1∼χ23m(T−tˆc)
T−1∑
t=tˆc
λ0t,H1
 , (.42)
which can be approximated as follows:
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z0t,H1 ≈ ϕ1B1, where B1 ∼ χ2ν1 , (.43)
ϕ1 ,
3m(T − tˆc) + 2
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ0t,H1
)
3m(T − tˆc) +
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ0t,H1
) , (.44)
ν1 ,
[
3m(T − tˆc) +
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ0t,H1
)]2
3m(T − tˆc) + 2
(∑T−1
t=tˆc
λ0t,H1
) , (.45)
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z0t,H1∼Γ
(ν1
2
, 2ϕ1
)
≈ N (ν1ϕ1, 2ν1ϕ21), (.46)
where Γ
(
ν1
2 , 2ϕ1
)
is the Gamma distribution with parameters ν12 and 2ϕ1. We thus have
Λ|H1 ∼ N
(
µΛ|H1 , σ
2
Λ|H1 − 2κH1
)
, (.47)
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where
µΛ|H1 = ν1ϕ1 − 3m(T − tˆc), (.48)
σ2Λ|H1 = 2ν1ϕ
2
1 + 6m(T − tˆc), (.49)
κH1 = cov
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z0t,H1 ,
T−1∑
t=tˆc
z1t,H1
 . (.50)
The covariance κH1 is computed in a manner similar to κH0 . We let Λ
std|H1 = Λ|H1−µΛ|H1√
σ2
Λ|H1−2κH1
∼
N (0, 1). Pd is given by
Pd =
∫ ∞
ρ′
p(Λstd|H1)dy = Q
 ρ′ − µΛ|H1√
σ2Λ|H1 − 2κH1

= Q

√
σ2Λ|H0 − 2κH0Q−1(α) + µΛ|H0 − µΛ|H1√
σ2Λ|H1 − 2κH1
 . (.51)
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